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ABSTRACT
JOHN CLUVERIUS: Grassroots Lobbying and the Economics of Political Information in
the Digital Age.
(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey)
Leading theories of grassroots lobbying assert that legislators should respond positively
to the volume of grassroots lobbying messages they receive because volume indicates the
salience of an issue among constituents. This notion rests on the idea that the cost of
producing a large volume of grassroots lobbying signals the value of the information to
legislators. Advances in technology and strategy, however, have flattened the costs associ-
ated with producing such information – it costs an interest group about the same to generate
one hundred email messages as it does ten thousand. In this environment, the volume of
grassroots lobbying no longer signals the value of the information it contains. Instead, trust
becomes the critical factor in evaluating grassroots lobbying, and with growing skepticism
of mass emailing efforts, volume of grassroots lobbying should have no effect or even a
negative effect. In this study, I test this theory using a survey of state legislators and inter-
views with legislators and interest group leaders. In a survey experiment, I find (contrary
to previous work) that lobbying message volume has no effect on legislator responses to
higher-salience issues, and a negative effect on lower salience issues. Interviews with leg-
islators and coded open responses from the survey confirm that these effects are produced
because legislators do not trust high-volume grassroots lobbying efforts. In interviews with
state legislators, I find that the resources legislators are provided, particularly legislative
staff, enable them to better trust grassroots lobbying information. In the context of other
information sources, access to resources and majority party status also affect which source
of information legislators trust most.
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For everyone whose preferences are risk-accepting enough
to run for office,
work for a cause,
or open a brewery.
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1 INTRODUCTION: GRASSROOTS LOBBYING, TRUST,
AND A NEWMODEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
“...in the face of improving technological means to generate phony grass roots,
it is vitally important that we come to terms with the way groups can lead poli-
cymakers away from popular policies that will benefit most citizens. Research
on outside lobbying can help. If we want our government to respond more to
the mass public and less to privileged minorities, then it is helpful to be able to
define, understand, and recognize the difference.”
–Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying, page 162
Introduction
At the end of 2011, my former employer, Salsa Labs, Inc., claimed that in that year, their
clients had sent more than 1.2 million emails from constituents to elected officials. Other
companies and the advocacy groups that serve them fixate on the number of emails sent to
elected officials as a topline measure of their political efficacy. This makes sense; motivat-
ing members to contact legislators is not easy. Members need to be informed enough about
an issue to support a policy position. Members also have incentive to free ride; their mem-
bership is usually conditional on dues, not on participation in activist activities. However,
this metric does not accurately capture the impact of constituent contacts on the legisla-
tive process. Measuring efficacy has proved challenging, so organized interests count the
emails sent by members and hope it counts for something.
However, many of these efforts are duplicative: they repeat arguments that legislators
have heard before. Mass advocacy efforts are not new; before the email era, groups used
postcards that would be sent to group members and then forwarded with postage by the
member to a legislative office. Organized interests used these in lieu of letter-writing cam-
paigns. Groups believed that these contacts had two effects. They gave the legislator a
signal of the interest group’s power within the legislator’s district. They would also, in
some cases, signal the importance, or salience of a particular issue to legislators. The more
effort an interest group had to undertake to motivate their members (and thus, the fewer
contacts received), the less salient the issue was believed to be by legislators.
The information age has made the constituent-legislator contact a much easier enter-
prise. Advocacy groups can track who in their membership has contacted which legislator
about which particular issue. Groups can also target individual messages to specific legis-
lators, thanking legislators for their support on current legislation, and critiquing legislators
who oppose them. Organized interests can also create webforms, which allow members to
choose pre-written content to send to their legislator at the click of a mouse.
No group attempts to make their grassroots lobbying efforts to look phony. However,
technological innovations have made it more difficult to tell the difference between which
grassroots lobbying efforts are phony and which are real. More importantly, the cost of
generating these email campaigns has flattened, that is to say, the cost of producing one
additional email to a legislator, all else equal, has decreased. We observe cost-flattened
information environments all the time in everyday life. Much like a consumer trying to de-
termine whether their local restaurant truly offers a five-star dining experience, a legislator
is trying to determine whether the hundreds and thousands of emails they receive about an
issue are a genuine outpouring of concern among constituents or merely spam sent to every
legislator from all over the country.
When costs flatten, legislators gain less information from the amount of email they
receive from constituents because that amount no longer conveys anything about how hard
the group worked or how salient the issue might be. Volume used to provide a useful signal
of the usefulness of information. When costs flatten, that signal is no longer useful. Instead
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of cost, legislators focus most on the trustworthiness of information.
What Trust Means
Information can be trustworthy in three ways: that it accurately represents the views
of the mass public in the legislator’s district, that it accurately represents the views of an
issue public in the legislator’s district, and that the information accurately represents the
membership of an advocacy group in the district. Trustworthy information accurately and
reliably can be used by legislators to help them accomplish their goals. These goals include
re-election, protecting majority status of their party, good public policy, and advancing in
the institution. Though the trustworthiness of other sources of information are discussed in
Chapter 4, this dissertation focuses primarily on grassroots lobbying. In the case of grass-
roots lobbying, all trustworthy information should, in the mind of the legislator, contain
true and relevant statements about constituent preferences on policy issues. Trustworthy
emails come from constituents, not people outside the district or the state.
First, and most importantly, legislators consider information to be trustworthy if it reli-
ably and accurately reflects the attitudes of an issue public – a small group of people who
pay attention to a particular issue – in their district. People with the capacity to contact their
legislator usually have a personal experience with an issue and are highly informed. These
constituents also tend to be more willing to cast their vote based on a single issue. The clas-
sic example of this type of grassroots lobbying is the National Rifle Association (NRA).
NRA members write frequently to their legislators on gun issues and are considered to be
reliable voters on that particular issue.
Second, legislators consider grassroots lobbying information to be trustworthy if it ac-
curately and reliably reflects the issue preferences of the mass public in the legislator’s con-
stituency. On highly controversial issues, legislators want to know how their constituents
feel about an issue, especially if they do not have previous information about citizen atti-
tudes. At the same time, legislators gain information about the mass preferences of their
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district through campaigns, polling information, and trusted contacts within their district.
Third, grassroots lobbying can be a signal of interest group power in the electorate.
Legislators who received postcards sent from constituents on behalf of interest groups could
usually count the cards to get a good idea of how many active members a group had in their
district. With email, however, constituents must identify themselves as a member of that
organization in the email in order to signal that interest group power to the legislature. Very
few emails to legislators contain this information. Among organized interests, the norm is
to not include this information in form emails written for constituents to send. As a result,
trustworthiness is empirically evaluated as an accurate and reliable measure of the policy
preference of either the mass public in the legislator’s district, or an issue public in the
legislator’s district.
Trust-Driven Legislator Behavior
The trustworthiness of information determines its value in a market when the costs of
providing information to legislators are flattened. When this happens, we should expect
that legislators will consider the trustworthiness of information from grassroots lobbying
more than the volume of emails sent to them. Email volume also provides a negative signal
in the case where the issue discussed is not well-established. A high volume of emails
looks like a mass email from an interest group, not a signal of a particular issue public.
Legislators are more suspicious of grassroots lobbying on lower salience issues because
fewer constituents know about the issue and are likely to have formed an opinion about
it. Because almost no emails include the name of the interest group generating them, the
volume of emails also does not signal interest group power. On higher salience issues,
legislators receive much more information from all sources, and the negative signal from a
high-volume grassroots lobbying campaign gets lost in the rest of the noise.
Instead, legislators will value information that is trustworthy from grassroots lobbying.
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Legislators tend to talk about content rather than having too much or not enough informa-
tion from a particular source. They say that they prefer content that helps identify grassroots
lobbying messages as being genuinely from a constituent. Legislators say that they look
for signals of a developing or shifting issue public, usually in the form of personal narra-
tives from constituents. Constituents might email their legislators personal stories about
hardships with high gasoline taxes, the need to use a car share service to navigate the city
at night when taxis will not come, or the death of a loved one at the hands of a police offi-
cer. Because these messages focus on personal experience with policy rather than a broad
argument about whether policy is good or bad, they signal reliable and accurate attitudes
of an issue public in the legislator’s district.
Forming trust with sources of information requires resources. Legislators who have
more time in the legislative session to weigh the information they get will trust grassroots
lobbing messages more because they can separate trustworthy messages from untrustwor-
thy ones. A legislator will likely receive emails from both sides of an issue, and more
time in session gives legislators more time to read through emails and determine which
are genuinely representing an issue public and which are not. Legislators with more staff
will also be able to separate trustworthy and untrustworthy information better because staff
help extend the legislator’s information processing based on their own experiences with
constituents and interest groups. Staff may have connections with groups or constituents
that the legislator does not. Staff also may be more aware some issue public attitudes than
the legislator. By contrast, legislators in less-well resourced bodies will be more likely to
dismiss all grassroots lobbying messages as equally untrustworthy.
Trustworthy relationships are also dependent on risk. Legislators who are more risk-
averse will be less likely to trust grassroots lobbying messages and other outside sources of
information. These legislators find information sources that are closest to them most trust-
worthy. Those sources convey similar information about the attitudes of issue publics and
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mass publics in the legislator’s district, as well as interest group power in the district. How-
ever, legislators choose to get this information from close advisors rather than grassroots
lobbying or other sources.
Plan of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I explore how legislators form trustworthy relationships with infor-
mation sources, focusing on grassroots lobbying in particular. I envision trust as the central
feature of an information marketplace where legislators are consumers of information. I
use a mix of methodological techniques organized around two data-gathering projects. The
first is a series of interviews with legislators, legislative staff, and interest group leaders
conducted over the summer of 2013. The second is an extensive survey of state legislators
conducted in the summer of 2014. Full text of the survey is presented in Appendix B.
I have written the dissertation as a response and update to Ken Kollman’s excellent 1998
book, Outside Lobbying. I challenge several of the conclusions in his book, particularly the
structure of the relationship between the volume of contacts and issue salience and how
different types of issues encourage different interest group strategies. I find that Kollman’s
warnings – issued at the end of his book and reprinted at the beginning of this section
– have come true; worse, grassroots lobbying in its current state seems to offer minimal
benefits for any of the parties involved. Interested citizens who care passionately about
an issue are either diverted to form email campaigns or are drowned out by interest group
mobilization. Legislators lack trustworthy information about what constituents want from
them policy-wise.
Chapter 2 disputes previous findings on how the volume of emails generates legislator
response. I use an experiment that varies hypothetical emails a legislator receives. The
experiment has two different types of email treatments, one that varies the salience of the
issue, and one that varies the volume of emails that I tell the legislator they received. I find
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that on a lower-salience issue, the volume of emails has an inverse effect on legislator re-
sponsiveness; legislators who receive the higher-volume/lower salience treatment are about
half as likely to say they will take a requested action (like voting for the bill on the floor)
than those in the higher volume/higher salience treatment.
Chapter 3 uses interviews and the free-response section of the survey to examine the
effects of information processing resources on trust formation. If the market analogy holds,
and trustworthiness is the central feature of that market, better-resourced legislators should
be able to better navigate the marketplace more easily, and should be more responsive to
grassroots lobbying if they are able to develop ways of processing the deluge of emails that
they receive. I find that with grassroots lobbying, most of the information processing power
of legislators comes from staff expenditures and the ability of legislators to use their staffs
to help handle constituent contacts.
Chapter 4 takes a step back to evaluate the role of grassroots lobbying and cost flattening
in legislator information processing writ large. I use a multinomial logit model to deter-
mine the effects of legislative professionalism and majority party status on a legislator’s
most trusted source of information. I find some support for my theory. Majority party leg-
islators show little variance across legislative professionalism for their most trusted source
of information. Minority party legislators become more trusting of email messages from
constituents and party leaders, and less trusting of polling information and professional
lobbyists as legislative professionalism increases.
Finally, a note to readers: some of the theory sections are repetitive, even to the point
of copying arguments in previous theoretical sections verbatim. I chose this to let each
chapter stand alone as a component of the larger theoretical argument. None of this work
has been published in a peer-reviewed journal, so self-citation would not be possible in this
case.
7
2 GRASSROOTS LOBBYING AND ISSUE SALIENCE:
THE FLATTENED COST OF SIGNALS
Introduction
On their own and motivated by groups, Americans send hundreds of thousands of mes-
sages to legislators across all levels of government on policy matters (Butler, Karpowitz
and Pope 2012). In surveys and interviews, legislators at every level say they want to hear
from constituents about policy issues, but recent changes in technology and groups (Karpf
2012) have reshaped how constituents contact legislators and how interest groups wield
grassroots lobbying as a tool to accomplish their goals.
Leading theories of information in legislatures and explanations of grassroots lobby-
ing rely on the assumption that the cost of producing information signals something about
that information’s value. However, the costs of producing this information have flattened,1
meaning that the cost of producing one hundred email messages is about the same as the
cost of producing ten thousand email messages for both interest groups and constituents.
Developments in the tactics of grassroots lobbying and the dynamics of interest organiza-
tions have flattened the costs of grassroots lobbying for interest groups and incentivized
more groups to use the tactic more often as a means of maintaining the organization. To
explain information processing by institutional actors in the digital age, we need theories
that explain how political actors in institutions respond when information is still costly, but
where these costs do not signal value.
In this paper, I present an economic theory of political information where trust replaces
1In this case, flattening is the process by which marginal costs, or the costs of producing an additional
unit, are reduced. A detailed explanation is provided in the section labeled “The Flattening of Information
Costs.”
cost. Political actors treat information like a commodity. They use heuristics to help deter-
mine the value of information. Previously, legislators were able to use email volume – the
number of emails (or other messages) sent – as a positive signal of the value of this infor-
mation (Kollman 1998). However, when costs are flattened, volume sends a meaningless
or negative signal about the value of that information because legislators believe these ef-
forts to be fake or untrustworthy. Instead, legislators use the trustworthiness of information
primarily to signal its value.
I used a series of interviews with state legislators to help refine the theory and shape
the expectations derived from it. If trust replaces price, the volume of messages should not
have a positive effect on legislator response. I expect that legislators are responding to in-
formation they deem to be trustworthy, not the signal provided by the volume of grassroots
lobbying efforts. I test this theory using a survey experiment that alters the tone, volume,
and issue salience of hypothetical grassroots lobbying messages sent to state legislators,
and I measure their responses to these messages in the survey. I find that while the volume
of email messages has no effect on higher-salience issues, legislators who see higher vol-
ume messages on lower-salience issues are less likely to respond to them. The effect is both
statistically and substantively significant: the predicted probability of a legislator voting for
legislation supported by a lower-salience/higher-volume treatment is half that of the prob-
ability of a legislator voting for a hypothetical bill supported lower-salience/lower-volume
treatment. I find no effect for difference in email tone. From a hand-coded analysis of free-
text responses to the survey, I find that legislators talk about trust in evaluating messages
more than volume.
Grassroots Lobbying Defined
Grassroots lobbying is distinct from other forms of citizen/legislator communication
and other forms of lobbying. Grassroots lobbying falls within the broader category of out-
side lobbying, which refers to mobilization of those outside the institution. It is a direct
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communication between a citizen who is not a registered lobbyist and a legislator or leg-
islator’s office. The citizen may or may not be a constituent.2 Grassroots lobbying is not
constituent service; grassroots lobbying messages contain both an issue position and a rec-
ommended legislative action. A message requesting assistance with the Social Security
Administration is constituent service; a message requesting the legislator support changes
in Social Security policy is grassroots lobbying. A variety of organized interests can use
grassroots lobbying as a tactic, though not all do.3 Grassroots lobbyists are wholly am-
ateurs; they do not register as lobbyists and are not in the paid employ of an advocacy
organization. They tend to be “high-information” citizens, and are likely members of one
or more organized interests.
The Flattening of Information Costs
The costs of grassroots lobbying have flattened in the information age. Costs are flat-
tened when the cost of producing something of higher volume or quality decreases relative
to the cost of producing something of lower volume or quality. This happens when marginal
costs (the cost of producing one additional unit) decrease. The effort required by interest
groups to get 1000 members to contact their legislators is lower than it was before, as group
members no longer need to compose lengthy letters and pay postage to contact legislators.
In addition, the scalability of interest group membership and email systems have flattened
the costs of grassroots lobbying; the costs of getting 1000 members to contact their legis-
lator is much closer to the cost of getting 100 members to contact their legislator than it
used to be.4 Flattening occurs for individuals as well; citizens need to expend less effort
2Interviews of state legislators that I conducted reveal substantial variance in their desire to hear from
non-constituents. There is no clear pattern in the data about this desire across either personal or institutional
factors. Members of the United States Congress, on the other hand, report almost unanimously that they only
want to hear from their constituents (Fitch, Goldschmidt, Fulton and Griffin 2005).
3In interviews, I spoke to leaders of trade groups, labor unions, citizen groups, and business groups. All
reported using grassroots lobbying in some form. All different types of organized interests use grassroots
lobbying, but not all groups do.
4Costs have also decreased in the information age. For instance, the cost of generating 1000 emails is
lower than it used to be. The decrease mechanism has been observed by other scholars (Ringe and Victor
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to contact more legislators on more issues than they did previously. If grassroots lobbying
is a costly signal as Kollman (1998) claims, then we should observe a key aspect of costly
signaling theory, that the actor who receives the signal learns about the sender through the
cost to the sender of sending the signal (Hall, Van Houweling, and Beckmann 2012).
Assumptions
All else equal, legislators want to be re-elected. They are not “single-minded seekers of
re-election” (Mayhew 1974), but legislators generally need to be re-elected to accomplish
their other goals in government5. All else equal, legislators view responsiveness to citizen
needs as helpful to their chances of re-election (Bianco, Spence and Wilkerson 1996). In
order to be responsive, legislators must have information about the policy preferences of
their constituents.6 Among constituencies, legislators seek the most information about
their re-election and primary7 constituencies (Fenno 1977; Butler and Nickerson 2011).
Whether they appeal more to their re-election constituency or their primary constituency
is not as relevant as the fact that legislators seeks information about the preferences of the
constituency (or constituencies) that they need to win re-election. Legislators may seek
information from trusted individuals in their district (Fenno 1978), from parties (Aldrich
1995; Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010), or from interest groups (Hall and Deardorff
2006).
With a variety of sources of information, legislators must decide how valuable sources
of information are, and how those sources help them do their jobs. To be successful, interest
groups want to offer the most valuable information possible to legislators, and they create
2013), but the flattening mechanism is more relevant to my theory.
5Beyond re-election, these goals include advancement in the chamber, good public policy, and majority
status for their party (Fenno 1978; Cox and McCubbins 2004)
6This desire for information is not exclusive to the policy preferences of constituents. Legislators seek a
variety of information to do their jobs.
7There some evidence that legislators fear primary challenges more now than they did previously. Recent
research attributes this phenomenon to the development of ideological fundraising and new types of partisan
organizations that operate outside of traditional party structures (Boatright 2013).
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this information through interaction with members and potential members.
How Legislators Gain Information
Obtaining, processing, and evaluating information is important to legislators. Legis-
lators develop institutional structures and rules to assist information processing. For ex-
ample, the Massachusetts colonial legislature formed its committee structure to deal with
information overload from citizen petitions (Jameson 1894; Higginson 1986). Studies of
institutional systems show that these informational arrangements also shape the power of
legislators within the body. Krehbiel (1991) argued that the committee structure of the U.S.
Congress was designed to create unbiased and representative committees by encouraging
individual legislators to become policy experts. While Krehbiel’s findings are disputed by
scholars who argue for a more party-centered organizational structure (Rohde 1991; Cox
and McCubbins 2004; Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010), the finding that legislators
must bear costs to gain policy information and that committee structures help allay these
costs for some legislators remains robust.
Lobbying is an important source of information. The provision of information to leg-
islators and bureaucrats is considered an important tactic of “insider” or “direct” lobbying
(Walker 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). Gathering ex-
pert information and disseminating it to policymakers is a costly activity, but the results
are mixed as to whether resource-rich interests win more policy conflicts (Baumgartner,
Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth and Godwin 2013). Much
of what we understand about “outside” lobbying – policy activism through the mobilization
of citizens, comes from Kollman’s (1998) model of outside lobbying as the production of
costly information signals to legislators. Kollman’s model relies on the assumption that
issue salience and the costs of outside lobbying are inversely related; in other words, the
less a group’s members care about an issue, the more it costs to mobilize them, because
the group must bear the high costs of educating and mobilizing its members on a particular
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issue.
Legislators and Flattened Information Costs
Information overload, where an individual or institution has more information than
they can adequately process, shapes problems of politics. Political scientists have treated
information overload like an information deficit; legislators are “barraged with information
from a wide variety of sources, and lack the time and resources to effectively process the
information they receive” (Ringe and Victor 2013). This thinking finds that the costs of
producing information have decreased, but that legislators respond to information overload
they same way that they do to information deficits – they try to find more information. At
the same time, other political scientists say that information overload places bounds on the
rationality of human beings and human governance (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones
2001; Baumgartner and Jones 2015), forcing people to use heuristics, shortcuts that help
people process information quickly.
While institutions have helped legislators deal with information overload and the de-
mands of parties, citizens, and interest groups, the digital age has rapidly scaled up the
communications directed at legislators. The rates of citizen contact to politicians has in-
creased as much as tenfold in the last decade (Miler 2010). This surge of information has
produced both information overload and flattened the costs of producing information for
legislators.
With flattened information costs, it is harder for legislators to distinguish higher-value
information from lower-value information. When information costs decrease, actors who
process information can still gain some signal about the value of information. When in-
formation costs flatten, actors processing information lose the signal of that information’s
value. Because the costs of mobilizing members to engage in grassroots lobbying have
flattened, a grassroots lobbying campaign from an interest group who genuinely represents
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constituents on a more salient issue will appear almost identical to that of a grassroots lob-
bying campaign from an outside interest group with less support in the district on a less
salient issue. As citizen contact rates have increased, legislators are more likely to say that
they believe grassroots lobbying messages are fake and that they do not show how salient
issues are among constituents (Goldschmidt, Cooper and Fitch 2011). Legislators, there-
fore, need a new model of evaluating information, especially that from grassroots lobbying.
American legislative institutions reward information gains with greater power in the
institution (Lupia and McCubbins 1994), but legislators cannot infinitely process informa-
tion. While previous work found that legislators were likely to value professional lobbyists
for their information and expertise (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987), a recent survey of state
legislators found that they solely seek campaign contributions from professional lobbyists
rather than information (Powell 2012), regardless of the legislator’s goals in the institution.
When expertise is readily available, the issue becomes which expertise is most valuable.
Legislators are faced with large amounts of information, and thus must develop a system
to assign value to such information. Through this valuation, they determine which sources
are trustworthy and which are not.
The Marketplace of Political Information
Information scientists deal with an information environment much like contemporary
grassroots lobbying. Marketplace models of information allocate resources to end users
based on the desire for information, the value assigned to that information, and the cost
of that information. These models help actors deal with cost-flattened environments by
using trust to regulate them. (Atkins, Birmingham, Durfee, Glover, Mullen, Rundensteiner,
Soloway, Vidal, Wallace and Wellman 1996). Trust replaces cost as the primary feature in
the marker: buyers use trust as a signal of information value, and sellers use trust as a
signal to buyers about the value of the information they are offering. I apply this model to
politics; political actors create and sell information in a marketplace environment to other
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political actors who want to buy information in order to accomplish their goals. The roles
of individuals and groups are conditioned by internal and external constraints.
I add a number of refinements to the marketplace of information model that make it
more applicable to political processes. Political actors are more risk-averse than other
actors; they tend to more heavily discount future gains (Rohde 1979), and they tend to be
more responsive to uncertainty. Even average citizens become more risk-averse when mak-
ing political decisions and evalutating political information (Jacobs and Matthews 2013).
This refinement means that legislators will seek more information than they need to make
a decision. The marketplace of political information model uses the acceptance and in-
corporation of information as its transactions, rather than a monetary purchase. Political
scientists have used versions of this model before, treating expertise as a valuable com-
modity that legislators expend resources to obtain (Guston, Jones and Branscomb 1997).
In information marketplaces with flattened production costs, the supply element no longer
matters, instead trust is shaped by information resources.
Political actors pay a high cost for taking risks and failing; such failures tend to re-
sult in losses of position or power. This is not normally true of information marketplace
environments. In typical information marketplaces, there are risk-neutral preferences, as
information buyers are incentivized to innovate in purchasing information, and may agree
to less assured responses in order to reap benefits in the long term.8
Legislators and Grassroots Lobbying
Empirical work has borne out the effectiveness of grassroots lobbying in less con-
strained legislatures (Bergan 2009) and its ineffectiveness in more constrained legislatures
(Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). Bergan’s field experiment showed that on an anti-smoking
bill in a heavily citizen legislature, grassroots lobbying messages had a substantial effect on
8In general, information seeking actors do not discount future benefits as much as do political actors.
While this condition does affect the marketplace of political information, it is relevant to the theory only in
that it reflects the risk-averse nature of political actors.
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legislative action. However, it is unclear how legislators respond to messages that vary in
content, volume, and tone. The field experiment used individuals contacting legislators on
their own on a lower-salience issue, making it more likely that legislators would trust the
information that they received. The question remains as to what conditions the legislator
response to these efforts.
While legislators interpret lower-intensity grassroots lobbying messages as trustworthy,
they are more skeptical of high-intensity grassroots lobbying efforts, especially by email.
Flattened information costs means that legislators can no longer gain information from
the costs of sending the messages (or mobilizing citizens to do so). Grassroots lobbying
messages on higher salience issues provide no additional information, so the signal of ef-
fort has no effect on legislator’s willingness to respond with legislative action. However,
on lower-salience issues, the volume of messages is a meaningful signal of trust – lower
volume messages are trusted more because they are believed to not be from constituents.
Legislators should perceive lower-volume messages as generated organically rather than by
interest groups. From these expectations, I generate three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 On higher-salience issues, there will be no measurable difference
between higher volume and lower volume of emails on the probabil-
ity of a legislator taking a requested action
Hypothesis 2 On lower-salience issues, the probability that a legislator will take
a requested action will be less when the legislator receives a higher
volume of emails than when the legislator receives a lower volume
of emails.
Hypothesis 3 Legislators talk more about lacking trustworthy information from
constituents than lacking information or having too much informa-
tion.
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Data, Methods, and Results
I use two sources of data to test these hypotheses: interviews with state legislators
and responses from an original survey of state legislators. For this paper, I used two key
elements from the survey: an experimental treatment measuring email responses, and a
coded analysis of open-ended text responses from the survey. This section is organized
into three empirical subsections that combine the data, methods, and results for each of
these empirical approaches. The interviews are used to formulate the hypotheses and to
design the survey experiment, the survey experiment addresses Hypotheses 1 and 2, and
the open-ended responses address Hypothesis 3.
Elite Interviews
I conducted 31 interviews by phone or in person with state legislators, legislative staff,
and interest group leaders in seven states: Alaska, Utah, Maine, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Virginia, and New Hampshire. I emailed in these states to request interviews.
To ensure more truthful answers, I told all interviewees at the beginning of each interview
that their information would be de-identified; in all cases, I refer to interviewees using
information that is institutionally relevant, and do not use the name of the interview subject
or their state. The interviews were used to develop the theory and the survey instrument
used in the following sections.
Legislators from large and small districts used similar numbers when discussing the
emails they received from constituents and the number of emails that made a difference to
them. Legislators with and without staff also spoke in similar terms about the problems
of information and the difficulty in distinguishing a trustworthy email from an untrustwor-
thy one. The interviews also first introduced the idea that the volume of emails has an
interesting relationship with the trustworthiness of messages. When I asked one particular
legislator how he or she how knew which messages to trust and which to ignore, the leg-
islator told me “if I get less than five or more than fifty emails about any topic, I ignore
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it.” He or she explained that the former indicated no real interest among constituents, while
the latter indicated an effort by an outside interest group that was not worthy of his time.
Other interviewees echoed these numbers. Every legislator but one told me that the volume
of emails was something they thought about, even if they had a negative reaction to it. Six
additional legislators said that they look for a “sweet spot” of not too many emails, and not
too few, before they craft a response. Four of the interest group leaders told me that they
try to keep the number of emails sent to an individual legislature under fifty, while a fifth
told me “more than five emails to a legislator is a coup.”
The legislators I interviewed see a shift to a new model of constituent contact. One
legislator from a highly professionalized legislature told me that “the shift [from letters and
phone calls to emails] has been tectonic, incredible even, and along with that shift has been
a depersonalization.” Legislators rarely seem to talk about having too much information;
rather they lack trustworthy or useful information from constituents. While all the legisla-
tors I interviewed said they received large numbers of emails about a wide variety of topics,
they were hesitant to say it was too much, even when asked directly. Instead, they would
describe the emails as “too much noise, not enough real information.” Other legislators
called it “chatter” or “interest-group spam.” Some even went as far as to correct me when
I said that there was too much information, saying “no, there’s too much spam; it doesn’t
have much information.” These interviews helped me add to the trust language codebook I
developed for the open-ended response section.
Survey Experiment
I sent three email requests to complete my survey to 7,248 active state legislators over
six weeks in the summer of 2014. The survey excludes approximately 134 legislative dis-
tricts.9 The lists of state legislators and public email lists were obtained from OpenStates,
9Excluded legislators are distributed among all states, chambers, and parties. At least 90% of the legisla-
tors in individual states, chambers, and parties within chambers were included. Some legislators among the
134 do not have email addresses that are listed in any source. At the time of the survey, there were at least 32
state legislative seats that were vacant due to retirements, deaths in office, ethics investigations, and federal
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an online, open-source resource of information on government. Additional emails were
purchased from the National Conference of State Legislators, which maintains a private
email list for 99% of state legislators. The surveys were delivered by email using the
Qualtrics portal. Legislators received four email solicitations over a period of ten weeks.10
I gave respondents the option to have a staff member complete the survey, and included a
question asking whether the respondent was a staff member or a legislator. 512 respondents
completed at least one question.
The core of the survey is an experiment using one of each of two possible variations on
three treatment conditions (2x2x2) for a total of eight possible treatments. No control group
was used. The Qualtrics survey software randomly assigned respondents to a treatment as
they took the survey. Legislators are told that they receive the email from a constituent and
either 6 (lower volume treatment) or 60 (higher volume treatment) similar emails about a
hypothetical bill. The email displayed also varies in tone, using a formal, technical style
(formal tone treatment), or an informal tone (informal tone treatment). The content of
the message also varies on issue. I use two issues to separate the role of issue salience, a
hypothetical bill that creates a 45-day waiting period to purchase a handgun (higher salience
treatment), and a hypothetical bill that requires that all genetically modified (GMO) foods
be labeled (lower salience treatment).11 Table 2.1 shows the distribution of the treatment
variables.
The dependent variable in the model is a binary outcome question asking legislators if
they would take a particular action in response to the hypothetical email. A list of pos-
sible responses with check-boxes was provided on the survey. Respondents may choose
indictments.
10Full copies of the survey are included in Appendix request of the author. The survey and its data were
authorized by the University of North Carolina Office of Human Research Ethics Non-Biomedical IRB, study
number 14-0420.
11These issues were chosen in consultation with a number of legislators I interviewed. In the interviews,
legislators repeatedly said that gun control issues were the most relevant regulatory issues in their legislature,
and that while they knew about GMO labeling, their constituents did not.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Treatments
low salience high salience
low volume 104 107
high volume 92 96
Table 2.2: Distribution of Dependent Binary Variables
Action y = 1 y = 0
Introduce Bill 34 365
Co-Sponsor Bill 77 322
Vote for Bill on Floor 130 269
Urge Fellow Legislators to Support Bill 65 334
any, all, or check a box labeled “none of the above.” For this analysis,12 I chose the fol-
lowing legislator responses: introduce the bill “by request”13 on behalf of a constituent,
co-sponsor the bill, vote for the bill on the floor, and urge fellow legislators to support the
bill. Distributions of these binary variables are reported in Table 2.2.
To analyze the data, I used a logistic regression model with binary variables for three
of four possible categories: lower salience and higher volume, higher salience and lower
volume, and higher salience and higher volume.14 Numerical results are presented in Table
A.1 in appendix . For ease of interpretation, I converted the regression results into predicted
probabilities, and report these predicted probabilities in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
To better evaluate whether there is a measurable difference between the predicted prob-
ability of a legislator responding to the volume treatments while holding salience constant,
12Other possible responses were included in the survey, but were not used for this analysis because they
were similar to the responses analyzed or did not offer any theoretically relevant additions to this paper. The
excluded possible responses are: Vote for the bill in my committee if appropriate, Break with state party
leaders to support the bill, Vote against the bill, Reply to the email personally, Send a form response email to
the constituent, and None of the above.
13Submitting a bill “by request” is a tag that identifies a bill introduced by a legislator as being introduced
at the request of a constituent.
14The lower-salience/lower-volume variable was excluded the excluded category to avoid perfect multi-
collinearity.
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I simulate15 first differences in the predicted probabilities, comparing the predicted prob-
ability when volume is higher to the predicted probability when volume is lower, holding
issue salience constant at either higher or lower salience based on the analysis. Simulat-
ing these reduces the simulated quantity of interest from two estimates to one (King 1989;
King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Carsey and Harden 2014), creating an estimate of the av-
erage difference between two values of the explanatory variable of interest, and a measure
of uncertainty around that estimate.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the predicted probability plots16 for the higher-salience treat-
ments and lower-salience treatments respectively. These predicted probabilities are calcu-
lated by regressing the binary response variables on the lower salience/higher volume treat-
ment, higher salience/lower volume treatment, and higher salience/higher volume treatment
variables. This can be expressed as:
Y(0,1) = β0 + β1Lower Salience/Higher Volume + β2Higher Salience/Lower Volume +
β3Higher Salience/Higher Volume + e.
Higher Salience Treatments (Hypothesis 1)
The higher salience (gun control) treatment predicted probabilities are reported in Fig-
ure 2.1. The mean predicted probability across both volume treatments and all four legisla-
tor responses is approximately .184, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately
.113, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .255. The mean predicted
probability across all four responses for the lower volume (6 email) treatments is approx-
imately .196, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .125 and an upper
95% confidence bound of approximately .268. The mean predicted probability across all
four responses for the higher volume (60 email) treatments is approximately .172, with a
lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .101 and an upper 95% confidence bound
15I use 1000 simulations for each of the simulated first difference calculations.
16Full regression tables are available in the Appendix to this article.
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Figure 2.1: Predicted Probabilities of Legislator Responses
to Higher Salience Treatment
of approximately .242. The predicted probability that a legislator in the sample said they
will co-sponsor the hypothetical bill is approximately .196, with a lower 95% confidence
bound of approximately .121 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .271
for those legislators who received the lower volume treatment, and approximately .167,
with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .092 and an upper 95% confidence
bound of approximately .241 for legislators who received the higher volume treatment.
The predicted probability that a legislator said they would introduce the hypothetical bill
“by request” is approximately .075, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately
.025 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .125 for those legislators who
received the lower volume treatment, and approximately .052, with a lower 95% confi-
dence bound of approximately .008 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately
.097 for legislators who received the higher volume treatment. The predicted probability
that a legislator said they would urge fellow legislators to support the hypothetical bill is
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approximately .168, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .097 and an
upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .239 for those legislators who received the
lower volume treatment, and approximately .135, with a lower 95% confidence bound of
approximately .067 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .204 for legis-
lators who received the higher volume treatment.The predicted probability that a legislator
said they would vote for the hypothetical bill on the floor is approximately .346, with a
lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .256 and an upper 95% confidence bound
of approximately .436 for those legislators who received the lower volume treatment, and
approximately .333, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .239 and an up-
per 95% confidence bound of approximately .428 for legislators who received the higher
volume treatment.
Here, I report the results of simulating the first difference of the higher salience/lower
volume treatment from the higher salience/higher volume treatment.17. The mean of the
simulated first difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator in the sample would
cosponsor the hypothetical bill by request is approximately -.028, with a lower 95% confi-
dence bound of approximately -.013, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately
.093. The mean of the simulated first difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator in
the sample would introduce the hypothetical bill “by request” is approximately -.022, with a
lower 95% confidence bound of approximately -.091, and an upper 95% confidence bound
of approximately .049. The mean of the simulated first difference in predicted probabilities
that a legislator in the sample would urge fellow legislators to support the hypothetical bill
is approximately -.034, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately -.135, and
an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .07. The mean of the simulated first
difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator in the sample would vote for the hy-
pothetical bill on the floor is approximately -.011, with a lower 95% confidence bound of
17This can be expressed as E(Y |Higher Salience/Higher Volume)-E(Y |Higher Salience/Lower Volume)
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Probabilities of Legislator Responses
to Lower Salience Treatment
approximately -.138, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .117.
Both the results of the predicted probability calculations and the simulated first dif-
ferences are consistent with Hypothesis 1, that there should be no difference between the
higher volume and lower volume treatments on higher salience issues. Within each re-
sponse, the confidence intervals from the predicted probabilities overlap; the upper 95%
confidence bound of the higher salience/higher volume treatments is greater than the lower
95% confidence bound for the higher salience/lower volume treatments. When simulating
first differences, all the 95% confidence intervals for the first differences between higher
salience/lower volume and higher salience/higher volume treatments contain zero. The dif-
ferences in predicted probabilities within higher salience treatments between higher and
lower volume treatments are not measurably different from zero for all the response cate-
gories measured.
24
Lower Salience Treatments (Hypothesis 2)
The lower salience (GMO food labeling) treatment predicted probabilities are reported
in Figure 2.2. The mean predicted probability across both volume treatments and all four
legislator responses is approximately .194, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approx-
imately .121, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .267. The mean pre-
dicted probability across all four responses for the lower volume (6 email) treatments is
approximately .279, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .195 and an up-
per 95% confidence bound of approximately .362. The mean predicted probability across
all four responses for the higher volume (60 email) treatments is approximately .109, with
a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .047 and an upper 95% confidence bound
of approximately .170. The predicted probability that a legislator in the sample said they
will co-sponsor the hypothetical bill is approximately .298, with a lower 95% confidence
bound of approximately .210 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .386
for those legislators who received the lower volume treatment, and approximately .098,
with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .037 and an upper 95% confidence
bound of approximately .159 for legislators who received the higher volume treatment.
The predicted probability that a legislator said they would introduce the hypothetical bill
“by request” is approximately .154, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately
.085 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .223 for those legislators who
received the lower volume treatment, and approximately .054, with a lower 95% confi-
dence bound of approximately .008 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately
.101 for legislators who received the higher volume treatment. The predicted probability
that a legislator said they would urge fellow legislators to support the hypothetical bill is
approximately .240, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .158 and an
upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .323 for those legislators who received the
lower volume treatment, and approximately .098, with a lower 95% confidence bound of
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approximately .037 and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately .159 for legis-
lators who received the higher volume treatment.The predicted probability that a legislator
said they would vote for the hypothetical bill on the floor is approximately .423, with a
lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .328 and an upper 95% confidence bound
of approximately .518 for those legislators who received the lower volume treatment, and
approximately .185, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately .105 and an up-
per 95% confidence bound of approximately .264 for legislators who received the higher
volume treatment.
Here, I report the results of simulating the first difference of the lower salience/lower
volume treatment from the higher salience/higher volume treatment.18. The mean of the
simulated first difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator in the sample would
cosponsor the hypothetical bill by request is approximately -.20, with a lower 95% confi-
dence bound of approximately -.303, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately
-.094. The mean of the simulated first difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator
in the sample would introduce the hypothetical bill “by request” is approximately -.097,
with a lower 95% confidence bound of approximately -.182, and an upper 95% confidence
bound of approximately -.016. The mean of the simulated first difference in predicted
probabilities that a legislator in the sample would urge fellow legislators to support the
hypothetical bill is approximately -.141, with a lower 95% confidence bound of approxi-
mately -.245, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately -.035. The mean of
the simulated first difference in predicted probabilities that a legislator in the sample would
vote for the hypothetical bill on the floor is approximately -.236, with a lower 95% confi-
dence bound of approximately -.362, and an upper 95% confidence bound of approximately
-.112.
18This can be expressed as E(Y |Lower Salience/Higher Volume)-E(Y |Lower Salience/Lower Volume)
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Both the results of the predicted probability calculations and the simulated first differ-
ences are consistent with Hypothesis 2, that on lower-salience issues, the probability that
a legislator will take a requested action will be less when the legislator receives a higher
volume of emails than when the legislator receives a lower volume of emails. Within each
response, the confidence intervals from the predicted probabilities do not overlap; the upper
95% confidence bound of the lower salience/higher volume treatments is less than the lower
95% confidence bound for the lower salience/lower volume treatments. When simulating
first differences, all the 95% confidence intervals for the first differences between lower
salience/lower volume and lower salience/higher volume treatments do not contain zero.
All four first differences for the lower salience treatments also indicate that the predicted
probabilities for the higher volume treatments are lower for all the response categories mea-
sures. This a substantively relevant finding as well, for the lower salience treatments, the
predicted probability that a legislator will take any action is 14.4 percentage points lower
when the legislator receives a higher volume treatment.
Open-Ended Legislator Responses
The survey also contained a free-response section at the end of the survey asking re-
spondents for additional thoughts, comments, or statements to help me better understand
what they hear from constituents and how they respond. 265 of 512 respondents com-
pleted this section of the survey. All these 265 respondents wrote at least one complete
sentence of text. I coded these responses for how legislators respond to emails, and what
the respondents said would motivate them to change behavior.
In particular, I coded messages for mentions of the volume of emails and the trustwor-
thiness of emails. The coding system produced six binary variables: a mention of volume,
a mention of too much volume, a mention of too little volume, and a mention of trust. Re-
sponses were coded as mentioning volume if they referred to a number of emails by number
or in text, or if they used phrases like “too much,” “not enough.” If the email mentioned
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volume, I looked for relational words that described whether the legislator thought they
were receiving too many or too few email messages from constituents. For trust mentions,
I looked for references to trust and trustworthiness, along with words that legislators used
in interviews to describe trust related to email, such as “fake”,“form,” “spam,” or “cut and
paste.” Because I was using words to code for emotion, I validated my list of words to the
NRC Word-Emotion Lexicon (also called EmoLex) (Mohammad and Turney 2013), which
provides a list of words associated with trust in short-form messages.
Approximately 61% of legislators mentioned email explicitly in the text. In the form
responses, 73% of those legislators were coded as using trust language. Approximately
35% of legislators were coded as using email language. Within the group who mentioned
email explicitly, about 5% of tied volume to trust, saying that when they received large
amounts of email, they were “unbelieveable,” “untruthful,” or “fake.” While the evidence
is not as definitive, these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3, that legislators talk
more about trust than volume.
Conclusion
The survey experiment provides evidence disputing the notion that legislators count
email responses and treat them as a latent measure of issue salience. The higher-volume
treatments, even when aggregated, show legislators less willing to take meaningful action
on legislation when shown that more people are emailing them than when fewer people
are emailing them. Instead of treating grassroots lobbying like a costly signal from interest
groups, legislators are turned off by mass email efforts, especially on lower salience issues.
The results also show a negative effect for higher volume treatments on lower-salience
issues.
The open-ended survey responses show that legislators and staff think about trust and
credibility more than information deficits or information overload, meaning that trust seems
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to govern the marketplace for grassroots lobbying information more than a lack of infor-
mation or too much information. Legislators used to use email volume as a heuristic for
understanding grassroots lobbying. Instead, the trustworthiness of information is replacing
that heuristic.
Implications
Beyond the relevant hypotheses, these findings have greater implications for informa-
tion flows within and between political actors and for the relevance of costly signal games in
information overloaded environments. Information recipients need to develop new meth-
ods of analyzing information, and information senders need to adapt their strategies for
better communication. There are direct implications for the interaction between interest
groups, citizens, and legislators, and indirect implications for other information flows and
exchanges.
Cost flattening may occur in other legislative information environments, especially pro-
fessional lobbying, where the number of employed lobbyists and registered lobbying con-
tacts have greatly expanded, or on complex policy issues, where the amount of generated
expertise may be too much for legislators to distill. These scenarios are less likely to occur
where the cost of sending the signal is easier to determine, such as campaign contribu-
tions from individuals. Donations from interest groups or political action committees, who
compete for attention with another, may look more like a cost-flattened environment
In aggregate, constituents who lobby legislators about policy issues should be disheart-
ened, but individually, they should be empowered. Legislators find great value in com-
pelling narratives from individual constituents, especially on issues about which the legis-
lator knows little. This is not to say that groups who are considered powerful because of
their grassroots lobbying efforts should cease altogether, but rather that their power comes
from their ability to mobilize members around campaigns and elections, rather than grass-
roots lobbying. Groups like the National Rifle Association should be evaluated not in terms
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of how many letters or phone calls they can generate around a legislative fight, but rather
how many voters they can mobilize (or demobilize) in an election. The likelihood of chang-
ing a legislator’s mind on a major issue seems low, if not zero. Constituents may find it
more useful to contact legislators infrequently and on more obscure topics than to regularly
contact legislators. No legislator I interviewed said that they had generated a lasting trust
relationship with a constituent via email, and instead derided “frequent flyers” who seemed
to contact the legislator daily.
For interest groups using grassroots lobbying as a strategy to effect policy change on a
regular basis, especially on new and unknown issues, a more advisable strategy may be to
use small numbers of members to deliver personal messages that relate individual narratives
or personal experiences. Interest groups may also already be aware of the limited influence
that grassroots lobbying efforts have policy outcomes, and may instead use these actions to
maintain and measure their membership.
Information overload and flattened information cost should affect other information
flows beyond the one discussed in this paper. Legislators try to contact citizens through
email, along with interest groups seeking actions and donations. If legislators are compet-
ing for attention in constituent email boxes, it may be more difficult for legislators to signal
their policy positions to constituents. Citizen activists in particular may be overloaded with
information from multiple office-holders, campaigns, and interest groups. Trust would
seem to shape these environments as well; citizens seek trustworthy and distinctive infor-
mation from legislators. The flow of information between mass media and citizens should
also be disrupted by information overload, leading to the balkanization of media outlets
and emergence of explanatory journalism outlets within and outside of traditional outlets.
These findings imply a disconnect in the information exchange between organized in-
terests and legislators. Legislators are able to identify emails with a formal tone and with a
high volume as being from interest groups, but are most concerned with the fact that they
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do not know which group sent the messages. As a result, the signal from groups about
their relative strength in the legislator’s district (or the state as a whole) is lost. Interest
groups who use grassroots lobbying should encourage members to identify themselves as
a member of that interest group.19 This strategy would help groups signal power in the
electorate to legislators, and help legislators determine what groups are using constituents
to lobby them. Legislators do not gain policy information from mass emails; they gain
political information. By identifying themselves as group members, citizens will be able to
act collectively, groups will be able to leverage political power, and legislators will be able
to better process the signal of this collective action.
Finally, flattened information costs imply that institutional information exchanges should
be disrupted as well, especially when the number of signals sent between institutions over-
whelms the ability of actors to distinguish them. As the policy agenda expands and insti-
tutions receive more signals from one another, we may observe an increase in institutional
friction, disrupting the already complex flows between government institutions.
19The fact that grassroots lobbying groups have reduced the costs of becoming members complicates this
recommendation.
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3 HOW LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AFFECTS
GRASSROOTS LOBBYING
Introduction
Every day, Americans send thousands of messages to legislators asking for changes
in policy (Butler, Karpowitz and Pope 2012). Citizens send such messages on their own
and/or at the request of interest groups. Grassroots lobbying has undergone massive changes
in the last decade, fueled by the development and use of new advocacy communication
tools, changes in the meaning of “membership” in interest groups, and new ideological
groups that fight for attention with single-issue groups (Karpf 2012). Such changes raise
questions about how information about policy preferences flows between citizens, orga-
nized interests, and government in the digital age.
Leading theories of information in government do not adequately address the role of
grassroots lobbying in contemporary politics. Previous work has found that economic
forces like scarcity, production costs, and value govern information in legislators (Krehbiel
1991). In addition, others find that political information produces information processing
problems that human beings cannot solve rationally (Jones 2001; Baumgartner and Jones
2015); instead citizens and legislators use heuristics. Specific to grassroots lobbying, schol-
ars have described it as a costly signal about the salience of issues from interest groups to
legislators (Kollman 1998). However, changes in technology and interest group politics
have reduced the marginal costs of producing grassroots lobbying messages, disrupting the
way legislators seek out information, the ability of legislators to process information using
heuristics, and the signals sent by interest groups through citizens to legislators. We need
theories that address how legislators respond to information that lacks a costly signal.
To resolve this tension and update existing theories, I develop an economic theory of
political information where trust replaces cost. Political actors treat information like a
commodity, where buyers seek information to accomplish their goals, and sellers provide
information to accomplish their goals. Buyers and sellers each have their own set of con-
straints and incentives, and act rationally based on the constraints and incentives generated
in the marketplace environment and the institutions that surround it. These constraints and
incentives create trade-offs for political actors. Technology has a flattening effect on infor-
mation, meaning that the cost of producing 100 lobbying messages is much closer relative
to the cost of producing 1000 lobbying messages than it was before. When costs are flat-
tened, legislators use trust as the primary heuristic for determining the value of information
rather than ideally-priced information because the cost of generating the information pro-
vided no longer signals the salience of an issue or the policy preferences of constituents.
Among other factors, the ability to establish trust is conditioned on the information pro-
cessing resources available to buyers. In grassroots lobbying, legislators act as buyers of
information, and interest groups that engage in grassroots lobbying act as sellers.
If trust replaces price in information markets, I expect that legislators will vary in their
responses to grassroots lobbying due to their information processing resources. Resources
help people navigate market structures better, especially those governed by trust. With more
resources, legislators learn how to determine which messages are trustworthy and which are
not. Legislators who have fewer resources to process information will trust grassroots lob-
bying messages less compared to legislators with more information processing resources.
From 31 interviews and 265 open-ended survey responses from state legislators, I find that
legislators with longer legislative sessions to complete their work and more staff expendi-
tures trust grassroots lobbying messages more as a useful source of information. However,
in terms of responsiveness, longer legislative sessions make grassroots lobbying efforts by
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interest groups less successful, even for innovative groups, but more successful for individ-
uals.
The Marketplace of Political Information
Defining Grassroots Lobbying and Cost Flattening
Grassroots lobbying is distinct from other forms of citizen/legislator communication
and other forms of lobbying. Grassroots lobbying falls within the broader category of out-
side lobbying, which is the mobilization of those outside the institution being lobbied.1 It
is a direct communication between a citizen who is not a registered lobbyist and a legislator
or legislator’s office. This citizen may or may not be a constituent.2. Grassroots lobbying is
not constituent service; grassroots lobbying messages contain both an issue position and a
recommended legislative action. A variety of organized interests can use grassroots lobby-
ing as a tactic, though not all do.3 A message requesting assistance with the Social Security
Administration is a service request; a message requesting the legislator support changes in
Social Security policy is grassroots lobbying. There is no threshold for grassroots lobbying;
both a single contact by a constituent and an organized, thousand-plus contact campaign
are forms of grassroots lobbying. Grassroots lobbyists are wholly amateurs; they do not
register as lobbyists, and are not paid by advocacy organization. However, they tend to be
“high-information” citizens, and are likely members of one or more organized interests.
Costs are flattened when the cost of producing something of higher volume or quality
decreases relative to the cost of producing something of lower volume or quality. In other
words, flattening is a reduction in marginal costs. Cost-flattening is usually associated with
1For a detailed description of outsider and insider lobbying activities, see Nownes and Freeman (1998).
2In interviews, state legislators vary greatly on their desire to hear from non-constituents. There is no
clear pattern in the data about this desire across either personal or institutional factors. Members of the
United States Congress, on the other hand, report almost unanimously that they only want to hear from their
constituents(Goldschmidt, Cooper and Fitch 2011)
3In interviews, I spoke to leaders of trade groups, labor unions, citizen groups, and business groups. All
reported using grassroots lobbying in some form. All different types of organized interests use grassroots
lobbying, but not all groups do. In Nownes and Freeman (1998) found that 86% of interest groups mount
grassroots lobbying efforts, while 97% of interest groups use in-person professional lobbying.
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technological innovations. For instance, the cost of producing faster computers with greater
storage space declines regularly. The cost of adding additional online storage space acts
similarly. In the case of grassroots lobbying; technological tools have reduced the marginal
costs for citizens and interest groups for making additional grassroots lobbying contacts.
Assumptions
All else equal, legislators want to be re-elected. They are not “single-minded seekers of
re-election” (Mayhew 1974), but legislators generally need to be re-elected to accomplish
their other goals in government4. All else equal, legislators view responsiveness to citizen
needs as helpful to their chances of re-election (Bianco, Spence and Wilkerson 1996). In
this vein, I assume that legislators desire information about the policy preferences of their
constituents.5 Among constituencies, legislators seek the most information about their re-
election and primary6 constituencies (Fenno 1977; Butler and Broockman 2011). Whether
they appeal more to their re-election constituency or their primary constituency is not as rel-
evant as the fact that legislators seeks information about the preferences of the constituency
(or constituencies) that they need to win re-election. Legislators may see themselves as rep-
resentative of their district, seek information from trusted individuals in their district (Fenno
1978), from parties (Aldrich 1995; Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010), or from interest
groups (Hall and Deardorff 2006).
These assumptions suggest that legislators must evaluate the value of information that
is offered to them. With a variety of sources of information, legislators must decide how
valuable sources of information are, and how those sources help them do their jobs. It
also suggests that interest groups want to offer the most valuable information possible to
4Beyond re-election, these goals include advancement in the chamber, good public policy, and majority
status for their party (Fenno 1978; Cox and McCubbins 2004)
5This desire for information is not exclusive to the policy preferences of constituents. Legislators seek a
variety of information to do their jobs.
6There some evidence that legislators fear primary challenges more now than they did previously. Recent
research attributes this phenomenon to the development of ideological fundraising and new types of partisan
organizations that operate outside of traditional party structures (Boatright 2013).
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legislators, and that they create this information through interaction with members and
potential members.
The Role of Information in Legislative Politics
These assumptions lead to how legislators value information from interest groups and
constituents. Obtaining, processing, and evaluating information is important to legislators.
Legislators develop institutional structures and rules to assist information processing. For
example, the Massachusetts colonial legislature formed its committee structure to deal with
information overload from citizen petitions (Jameson 1894; Higginson 1986). Studies of
institutional systems show that these informational arrangements also shape the power of
legislators within the body. Krehbiel (1991) argued that the committee structure of the U.S.
Congress was designed to create unbiased and representative committees by encouraging
individual legislators to become policy experts. While Krehbiel’s findings are disputed by
scholars who argue for a more party-centered organizational structure (Rohde 1991; Cox
and McCubbins 2004; Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010), the finding that legislators
must bear costs to gain policy information and that committee structures help allay these
costs for some legislators remains robust.
American legislative institutions reward information gains with greater power in the
institution (Lupia and McCubbins 1994), but legislators cannot infinitely process informa-
tion. While previous work found that legislators were likely to value professional lobbyists
for their information and expertise (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987), a recent survey of state
legislators found that they solely seek campaign contributions from professional lobbyists
rather than information (Powell 2012), regardless of the legislator’s goals in the institution.
Expertise is readily available, the issue becomes which expertise is most valuable. Leg-
islators are faced with large amounts of information, and thus must develop a system to
assign value to such information. Through this valuation, they determine which sources
are trustworthy and which are not.
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Lobbying and Legislator Information
Lobbying is an important source of information. The provision of information to leg-
islators and bureaucrats is considered an important tactic of insider lobbying (also called
direct lobbying) (Walker 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999).
Gathering expert information and disseminating it to policymakers is a costly activity, but
the results are mixed as to whether resource-rich interests win more policy conflicts (Baum-
gartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech 2009; Godwin, Ainsworth and Godwin 2013).
Much of what we understand about outside lobbying, policy activism through the mobiliza-
tion of citizens, comes from Kollman’s (1998) model of outside lobbying as the production
of costly information signals to legislators. Kollman’s model relies on the assumption that
cost of generating information tells us something about the salience of issues among the
population. While previous work found that legislators were likely to value professional
lobbyists for their information and expertise (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987), a recent sur-
vey of state legislators found that they solely seek campaign contributions from profes-
sional lobbyists rather than information (Powell 2012), regardless of the legislator’s goals
in the institution.
Bounded Rationality and the Role of Heuristics
The bounded rationality literature finds that humans have trouble processing lots of
information, and that information processing has always been a difficult task for gov-
ernment (Simon 1955; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001), no matter their varia-
tion in structure, rules, size, or resources (Baumgartner, Breunig, Green-Pedersen, Jones,
Mortensen, Nuytemans and Walgrave 2009; Epp, Lovett and Baumgartner 2014). However,
the bounded rationality work argues that like human beings, government uses heuristics (or
informational shortcuts) to help simplify problems and smooth the process of information
processing. These heuristics vary in their success, but the resources legislators have are
critical to the heuristics they develop.
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Legislators create endogenous institutions to help solve information processing prob-
lems. For example, party organizations help structure the flow of policy and the preferences
of members (Aldrich 1995, 2011). They also develop member organizations to create in-
formal networks outside of party structures on similar policy concerns (Ringe and Victor
2013). When it comes to hearing from constituents, legislators also depend on a select
group of constituents (Fenno 1978) or use a signal from interest groups about the power of
their message (Kollman 1998).
Information Overload Disrupts Old Heuristics
Information overload7 shapes the problems of the twenty-first century by disrupting
the heuristics that humans use to process information. The shortcuts that humans use when
processing information become unstable, and must be replaced with new ones. Information
overload is marked by a rapid increase in the production of information (Trelles, Prins, Snir
and Jansen 2011). This information explosion is due to the compressed cost of producing
information.
Information overload is distinct from other information processing problems in gov-
ernment. Political scientists have treated information overload like an information deficit;
legislators are, “barraged with information from a wide variety of sources, and lack the time
and resources to effectively process the information they receive” (Ringe and Victor 2013).
Others treat the information processing problems of government as continuous, rather than
rapidly changing (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). In the case of grassroots lobbying, infor-
mation overload disrupts the signal from groups to legislators. Legislators can no longer
determine the value of the information they receive from interest groups based on the cost
of producing it. As a result, legislators must find new heuristics for processing grassroots
lobbying messages. In my theory, that heuristic is trust.
7Information overload is a form of cognitive overload where an individual or institution has too much
information to process.
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While institutions have helped legislators deal with information overload and the de-
mands of parties, citizens, and interest groups, the digital age has rapidly scaled up the
communications directed at legislators. The rates of citizen contact to politicians has in-
creased as much as tenfold in the last decade (Miler 2010). As citizen contact rates have
increased, legislators are more likely to say that they believe grassroots lobbying messages
are fake (Goldschmidt, Cooper and Fitch 2011).
The costs of generating information have flattened, but the costs of evaluating informa-
tion have not. Legislators retain the cognitive biases that they previously held, and lack
additional resources to manage information. Legislators in states have received insignifi-
cant increases (if increases at all) in pay, time, and staff resources to process information
(Bowen and Greene 2014).
Using Trust to Process Information
Other scholars find that in cost-flattened environments, people seeking information use
trust as the central feature of a marketplace of information. Information scientists deal with
an information environment much like contemporary grassroots lobbying. Marketplace
models of information allocate resources to end users based on the desire for information,
the value assigned to that information, and the cost of that information. These models
help actors deal with cost-flattened environments by using trust to regulate them. (Atkins
et al. 1996). Trust replaces cost as the central feature in the market: buyers use trust as a
signal of information value, and sellers use trust as a signal to buyers about the value of
the information they are offering. I apply this model to politics; political actors create and
sell information in a marketplace environment to other political actors who want to buy
information in order to accomplish their goals. The roles of individuals and groups are
conditioned by internal and external constraints.
I add a number of refinements to the marketplace of information model that make it
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more applicable to political processes. Political actors are more risk-averse than other ac-
tors; they tend to more heavily discount future gains (Rohde 1979), and tend to be more
responsive to uncertainty. Even average citizens become more risk-averse when making po-
litical decisions and evalutating political information (Jacobs and Matthews 2013). This is
a necessary condition, as this refinement means that legislators will seek more information
than they need to make a decision. The marketplace of political information model uses
the acceptance and incorporation of information as its transactions, rather than a monetary
purchase. Political scientists have used versions of this model before, treating expertise
as a valuable commodity that legislators expend resources to obtain (Guston, Jones and
Branscomb 1997). In information marketplaces with flattened production costs, the supply
element no longer matters, instead trust is shaped by information resources.
The marketplace of political information model uses the acceptance and incorporation
of information as its transactions, rather than a monetary purchase. Political scientists
have used versions of this model before, treating expertise as a valuable commodity that
legislators expend resources to obtain (Guston, Jones and Branscomb 1997). In information
marketplaces with flattened production costs, the supply element no longer matters, instead
trust is shaped by information resources.
Trust-driven models appear in research on other information exchanges in political sci-
ence. Browne (1995) found that trust determines how legislators get information from
constituents. Rather than rely on numerous constituents, legislators check in with a small
group of constituents whom the legislator trusts for advice on policy matters. In examining
how constituents evaluate legislators, Bianco (1994) found that constituents create com-
plex systems to evaluate the trustworthiness of their legislators. In both cases, legislators
are able to accomplish trustworthy relationships because of resources at their disposal.
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How Resources Help Legislators Evaluate Trustworthiness
States vary in the resources that they provide to legislators in three key ways. First,
state legislatures meet for different time periods throughout each year. Second, state leg-
islators are compensated at different levels for their work by the government. Third, state
legislators have differing levels of staff and office expenditures. Combined, these resources
are described as a measure of state legislative professionalism. (Squire 1993, 2007; Bowen
and Greene 2014). For the purposes of this paper, each of these are resources that can be
used by legislators to process information from grassroots lobbying and facilitate trust.
Resources help legislators evaluate the trustworthiness of information in three ways.
Time gives legislators repeated, separated experiences in the marketplace of information,
learning which sources are trustworthy and which are not. Staff help facilitate a network of
trustworthy sources; they are trusted for their judgment by the legislator, and are another
voice in the office who can evaluate the trustworthiness of a particular source. Pay reduces
the distractions that legislators have. They can focus their time on legislating rather than a
second job. While they may use heuristics to navigate this market, resources facilitate these
as well, helping them develop more trustworthy relationships.
The resources their institution provides legislators should both promote and constrain
their ability to process information from constituents. A legislator in a more profession-
alized institution, one that provides more time, money, and staff for legislators to do their
other work, would likely be able to better process information from grassroots lobbying
messages and would be more likely to respond to it. In contrast, legislative profession-
alism has a negative effect on professional lobbying. Less professionalized legislatures
have a greater need for information from lobbyists (Berkman 2001) and professionaliza-
tion promotes institutionalization, insulating legislators from lobbying (Berry, Berkman
and Schneiderman 2000). New surveys of state legislators have failed to find evidence of
the need for information from paid lobbyists at all (Powell 2012).
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This occurs because the information that lobbyists provide is different from informa-
tion from grassroots lobbying. Rather than information about policies, the information
from grassroots lobbying is the salience and popularity of issues among constituents (Koll-
man 1998). Legislators in more professionalized institutions have been found to monitor
the opinions of citizens more than legislators in less professionalized institutions (Maestas
2003). Likewise, the institutionalization of legislatures promotes trust relationships with
grassroots lobbying because staff help process information from constituents rather than
filter information the way they do with professional lobbyists.
Empirical work has borne out the effectiveness of grassroots lobbying in less con-
strained legislatures (Bergan 2009) and its ineffectiveness in more constrained legislatures
(Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). Bergan’s field experiment found that in New Hampshire, the
least professionalized legislature, grassroots lobbying messages had a substantial effect on
legislative action. Hojnacki and Kimball’s study analyzed lobbying strategies in commit-
tees in the United States Congress. Between both, there is a large amount of variance in the
resources provided to legislators. While legislators are motivated to gain more and more in-
formation about their constituents, institutions condition both the resources and incentives
legislators have to seek additional information.
When information is cheap and plentiful, the traditional economic models of informa-
tion do not hold. Legislators must use their experience in the information marketplace and
the resources that they have to identify trustworthy information. To test these expectations,
I identify three hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 4 As legislative session length increases in states, the likelihood that
a state legislator will say that he or she is responsive to grassroots
lobbying increases.
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Table 3.1: State Interviews and Variation on Variables of Interest
State Squire Index Party Control
Massachusetts .385 Democratic
Maine .089 Democratic
New Hampshire .027 Mixed
Virginia .131 Mixed
North Carolina .198 Republican
Utah .067 Republican
Hypothesis 5 As legislator pay increases in states, the likelihood that a state leg-
islator will say that he or she is responsive to grassroots lobbying
increases.
Hypothesis 6 As legislator staff expenditures increase, the likelihood that a state
legislator will say that he or she is responsive to grassroots lobbying
increases.
Data
I conducted 31 interviews by phone or in person with state legislators, legislative staff,
and interest group leaders in six8 states: Utah, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Virginia, and New Hampshire. I emailed every legislator to request interview in these
states. To encourage more truthful answers, I told all interviewees at the beginning of each
interview that their information would be de-identified; in all cases, I refer to interviewees
using information that is institutionally relevant, and do not use the name of the interview
subject or their state. Variation of these states on measures of state legislator resources are
described in Table 3.1.
To supplement these data, I used 265 free-text survey responses from a nationwide
survey of state legislators. The free-response question appeared at the end of a fifteen-
minute survey I sent to more than 7,000 legislators in all 50 states and 99 state legislative
8One state was excluded from these interviews, because the conversation did not discuss resource-related
issues.
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chambers.9 The free-response question asked legislators about their feelings about email
messages from constituents, whether these messages help legislators do their jobs, and why.
There were 512 total responses to the survey; 265 of these responded to the free-response
question. All the 265 responses to the free-response questions contain at least one complete
sentence of text. Summary statistics for the count of words are shown in Table 3.2. These
legislators were also told that their responses would remain confidential, so I refer to them
in their text and data only by their state.
I interviewed legislators and staff who occupy a variety of roles in the legislature. In
each state, I spoke to at least one member of each party in each chamber. I also spoke
to both party leaders and back benchers in each state. I spoke to both men and women,
people of different ages, and people with varying professions, from doctors and lawyers
to front office staff at professional sports teams. Most of the legislators I spoke to were
quality candidates (Jacobson 1987), people who held at least one elected office prior to
being elected to the legislature.10
I used a semistructured format (Leech 2002) for my interviews. I began with a descrip-
tion of my broad dissertation project and my desire to hear from legislators and interest
group leaders directly. The introductory question for both interest group leaders and leg-
islators was, “So you have constituents emailing legislators every day about policy issues.
What role do these have in your job?” I would try to give legislators who spoke in a more
narrative style the space to explain their thinking. I asked both group leaders and legislators
who they thought were sending the most emails and whether they thought that grassroots
lobbying made a differences. I also asked for descriptions of individual events, especially
when the subject believed that grassroots lobbying had made a difference.
9The full response set from the survey and survey question text are available upon request.
10While the Jacobson (1987) measure has some problems, it remains a robust measure of candidate quality
and predictor of challenger success, even in state legislative races (Van Dunk 1997). Repeated attempts to
refine the measure expend great data-gathering resources for at best, narrow improvements.
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The interviews were scheduled to last about 30 minutes for each subject, but some in-
terviews ran longer. While averages were consistent across gender, party, and left-right
ideology, my interviews in person averaged about 41 minutes, and my interviews by phone
averaged 29 minutes. I also found that meeting in an office generally lengthened an in-
terview. Legislators and interest group leaders appeared less rushed in their offices than
meeting at a secondary location like a coffee shop or restaurant.
The states I chose for interviews vary on factors that condition the ability of legislators
to process information. The states include both professionalized and non-professionalized
legislatures, especially with regard to the length of the legislative session. States also varied
on both their party control of the legislature, and unified party government. States were
not chosen at random: New England states in particular offer a variety of institutional
arrangements in a small geographic space. When I spoke with legislators, their legislative
session had either ended or was in recess; no legislative business took place on the days that
I conducted interviews. This convenience sampling may undermine broader inference from
the interviews, but the interview process has helped to test the theory using practical events
and give a better understanding of the day-to-day interaction of legislators. In addition, a
number of legislators gave me the opportunity to see some of the emails and messages sent
to them by constituents.
Some of the most useful insight in my meetings came from interest group leaders,
more than half of whom had worked at the legislative level in other states before their
position at the time of the interview. These interviews helped explain how changes in
institutions varied both their strategies in using grassroots lobbying and their belief in its
effectiveness. While I did not have any legislators who had served in other states in my
sample, four mentioned that they were active in national legislator organizations, and had
talked to legislators in other states about the messages they were receiving.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Free-Response Section Word Counts
Statistic Value
Mean 51
Median 40
Min 2
Max 315
Standard Deviation 41.40
Political scientists describe state legislator resources as measures of legislative profes-
sionalism, a combined measure of days in the legislature, legislator pay, and legislator
staff expenditures, indexed to the United States Congress (Squire 1993, 2007). However,
scholars have contested using an index to measure state legislative professionalism because
each component has a different theoretical meaning, and indexing to Congress censors the
range of legislative professionalism onto a scale that does not match the data-generating
process(Bowen and Greene 2014). Bowen and Greene also provided a more recent set of
data. I use their measures of pay, staff expenditures, and session length from 2010-2011
(their most recent year of available data) for my analysis.
As part of the interview process, I sought to evaluate how legislators respond to grass
roots lobbying. I did so by asking whether and how legislators replied to email messages
they received from constituents. I also explored whether legislators felt that such messages
changed their own legislative behavior in terms of bill introduction, co-sponsorship, floor
voting or other types of behavior in the chamber.
Discussion
Here, I present my findings on each of my three hypotheses. I include both free response
elements and quotes from interviews in this discussion. Free-response quotes use the verb
“wrote,” while interview quotes use the word “said.”
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Mixed Results as Session Length Varies
“Often the bill has already been voted on - we receive multiple emails from
the same person, often 5 to 10 emails. This is time that could be better spent.
Groups or organizations should develop a better system of communicating with
the elected officials – they should be better organized.”
–Anonymous New Jersey Legislator
From the interviews and open-ended responses, I find mixed evidence on Hypothesis
4, that as the length of a legislative session increases, legislators are more likely to be
responsive to grassroots lobbying. In states with shorter sessions, legislators tend to say
they do not reply to every email, do not take legislative action based on single emails
from constituents, but do take legislative action in response to some grassroots lobbying by
certain groups. In longer sessions, legislators tend to say they respond to every email, have
taken legislative action after a single email from a constituent, but lump all group grassroots
lobbying together, and do not separate out different groups. These results, however, seem
consistent with the underlying theory: legislators respond to the messages that they trust
based on their ability to process information, given the resources that they have.
In states with shorter sessions, legislators said and wrote that they did not have the time
to respond to email that they received. Approximately 70% of the legislators in the sample
who said that they respond to every email came from states with sessions longer than 151
days, in the top 25% of the distribution of session length. Legislators in shorter sessions
say things like, “We are a small state and our time is limited to study the issues for a better
understanding to make good policy decisions. My time is much better spent studying than
responding to canned emails that do not reach my constituents.” A legislator in a longer
session wrote, “I spend a lot of time trying to engage with the voters in my district. I
encourage them to send me emails.” A staff member from a state with a long session said,
“We take form emails very seriously. They’re very easy to deal with.” Regardless of what
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they write about their ability to reply to emails, legislators report feeling overwhelmed by
emails from constituents at similar rates. Legislators from across the distribution of days
also reported similar numbers of emails during a typical week in the legislative session.
Legislators in states with longer sessions are more able to recall single idiosyncratic
events where grassroots lobbying messages changed their mind on an issue. In my inter-
views, all the legislators from a state with a legislative session lasting 300 days or more
were able to recall at least one event where a single email from a constituent caused them
to vote differently on a bill, offer an amendment, or introduce a bill. In contrast, only
37.5% of the legislators in the state with the shortest session were able to recall such an
event. From my interviews with interest group leaders in these states, I was told that the
group leaders disavowed single emails from constituents, dismissing them as unpredictable
events that were near impossible for groups to leverage for their benefit.
In states with shorter sessions, the narrow window of the policy agenda rewards innova-
tive groups, and puts general-ideology groups at a disadvantage. In addition, legislators in
shorter-session bodies believe that large multi-issue ideological groups lack the sophistica-
tion to lobby them effectively. Group leaders in longer sessions say that their strategies are
less successful than group leaders in states with shorter sessions. An interest group leader
in a state with a 45 day session told me that her group was able to be strategic, and devote
members to single issues in the legislature, “punching through the noise.” In contrast, a
single-issue group leader in a state with one of the longest sessions said that, “I would love
45 days!”, later saying that the drawn out session makes it difficult to keep member atten-
tion focused on the legislature. These sentiments were echoed by legislators as well. It
seems difficult for groups that focus on a broad set of policies to garner attention no matter
the length of the legislative session (One legislator in a state with a shorter session called
tactics from his state’s progressive coalition “amateur hour”), legislators with some of the
shortest sessions say that single issue groups are able to get more legislators to introduce,
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co-sponsor, and vote on legislation because of grassroots lobbying.
Pay Has Little Effect on Legislators, Except at the Lowest Levels
“I’ve cobbled together odd jobs to support my legislative habit.”
–Anonymous Maine Legislator
The evidence from my field interviews and the free response section do not support Hy-
pothesis 5, that as legislator pay increases, legislator responsiveness to grassroots lobbying
increases. Neither legislators nor interest group leaders in my sample freely discussed the
effect of pay, except in states where legislator compensation is in the lowest 10% of states.
Unlike the other resources components, no legislators compare their pay to other states,
nor did they describe hypothetical scenarios where they were paid more or less. When
prompted, legislators considered their service as a legislator their first priority, even if their
legislative pay was low and pay from holding another job was higher. The only exception
is legislators in states with the lowest 10% of salary, who say that their low pay lowers their
motivation to respond to every email. These legislators also seem less able to tell which
emails are generated by interest groups and which are created by constituents, but this does
not seem to affect their legislative actions.
Only legislators in the bottom five states in legislator pay directly tie their pay to their
ability to reply to grassroots lobbying emails. I asked every legislator I interviewed if their
job would be easier if they were paid more or harder if they paid less, none answered
in the affirmative, including those in lowest-paying states. In states like Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Alabama, legislators write that they are less motivated to respond to emails
than those in other states, especially those from inside the state but outside the legislator’s
district.11
11This includes legislators who are the chairs of committees that cover statewide issues.
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Legislative Staff Make Legislators More Responsive
“Emails are an excellent enhancement of democracy, but I need staff to manage
[them] well.”
–Anonymous Florida Legislator
I find strong support for Hypothesis 6, that in legislatures with more staff expenditures,
the likelihood of legislators responding to grassroots lobbying increases. While interest
group leaders do not talk much about how staff affects how legislators respond to grass-
roots lobbying messages, legislators with and without staff resources say that staff are es-
sential to helping them process information from grassroots lobbying. Legislators across
all states say and write that staff make the job of replying to grassroots lobbying easier if
they have them, or make that job harder if they lack them. Legislators without staff are
unlikely to respond to grassroots lobbying messages at all; they say that they ignore emails
or delete them. Legislators with access to committee staff rely on committee staff to help
sort through email messages from citizens, especially if the member is the chair or ranking
member of a legislative committee. Legislators with full-time, member-specific staffs (and
large staff budgets) develop systems to sort and respond to emails; they are more likely to
say that they respond individually and en masse to grassroots lobbying messages.
In terms of communicating with constituents, legislators with staff are more responsive
to grassroots lobbying than legislators without staff. In states with high expenditures on
legislative staff, legislators are far more likely to say that they respond to every email they
get (including those not from constituents) than legislators with smaller numbers of staff.
This is true in states that give legislators personal staff and in states where legislators share
committee staff. The methods vary, in the free-response sections completed by people who
identified themselves as legislative staff, some wrote that they handled other work in the
office to give the legislator more time to reply to constituent emails. Other legislators with
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large staffs said that they made a point of training everyone in the office (including commu-
nications, policy staff, and interns) so that all emails would be handled quickly. Still others
depend on staff to help them weigh competing arguments from constituents. Legislators
without staff, however, often wish for more. One legislator from New Hampshire said, “I
delete everything that is not from someone living in my district. I try to answer those from
in district, but without any staff support, I only manage to answer some of those I receive.”
Legislators with staff also seem more responsive in terms of legislative action to grass-
roots lobbying than legislators without staff. Legislators with staff were more able to recall
introducing legislation, co-sponsoring legislation, or altering their vote based on grassroots
lobbying emails. It also appears that staff help legislators gauge public opinion; a legislator
in Michigan said, “If I receive more than 5 emails I consider the topic to be important in
my district. I seek input to find out if this is truly grassroots or generated by outside groups.
Many times I am neutral on the topic and the emails help me make up my mind.”
Implications
“The shift [from letters and phone calls to emails] has been tectonic, incredible
even, and along with that shift has been a depersonalization.”
–Anonymous Massachusetts Legislator
If grassroots lobbying functions like a marketplace of information, then the resources
available should condition the ability of legislators to work in the market. Legislators in
more professionalized states, on average, take grassroots lobbying more seriously, respond
to every email, and try to incorporate the information from grassroots lobbying into their
thinking. However, most of this variation is driven by staff resources, at least in terms
of how legislators attribute their usefulness. The role of pay, either as a mechanism for
attracting legislators who process information well, or for reducing the cognitive load on
legislators worried about making ends meet, seems not to work in this case. Legislators
may be unwilling to share that they care about how much they earn, but it is more likely
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that once in the legislature, they have already accepted the salary they receive as normal.
Previous studies of the role of legislator salary show that it alters the choice to run for
the legislature (among quality candidates), and the competition that others face (Maestas,
Fulton, Maisel and Stone 2006). In addition, other surveys of legislators have found that
legislators do not consider pay important to doing their job in either survey or experimental
settings (Carnes 2012).
Finding that longer legislative sessions make legislators less responsive still fits with the
marketplace of political information, considering that time allows for greater interactions
and for legislators to learn more about who is trustworthy and who is not. Faced with a
longer session, interest groups must do more to keep their members involved, and fight to
keep the attention of members over prolonged legislative battles. Legislators in these longer
sessions still value grassroots lobbying, but the kind that comes directly from constituents,
who generally suggest policy changes that the legislator has not considered. This places
larger groups at a disadvantage in these states.
These findings have meaningful implications for both legislative information flows and
interest group strategy. First, it suggests that the presence of staff and a legislator’s man-
agement of said staff affect the rate at which the policy concerns of constituents will be
addressed. The states with fewer staff expenditures also have smaller populations than
other states, but there was limited evidence that legislators with fewer constituents inter-
acted personally with constituents at a greater level. It seems that without legislative staff,
some of the concerns of constituents will go unanswered.
Interest groups must also innovate to use grassroots lobbying based on the legislature
they may be dealing with. In particular, it seems that groups will need more resources in
states with long (200+ day) legislative sessions, in order to sustain longer policy battles.
This can be a difficult proposition. I was able to meet with state chapters of national orga-
nizations across states; in every case, the physical size of the office and the number of paid
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personnel were similar. National organizations may want to devote more national resources
to states with longer legislative sessions in order to sustain policy battles.
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4 HOW LEGISLATORS RANK INFORMATION SOURCES
Introduction
Legislators need information to do their jobs. Every day at their jobs, legislators receive
information from advisors, party leaders, constituents, lobbyists, and others (Sabatier and
Whiteman 1985). Good information helps legislators win re-election, support good public
policy, and secure political power for themselves and their party. When inundated with in-
formation, legislators use heuristics and create institutions to help them process information
effectively.
Previous research has found that legislators know that the information they receive is
biased (Calvert 1985), that legislators use heuristic shortcuts to process information (Si-
mon 1955; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001) and that legislators use the cost
of producing information as a signal about that information’s value (Denzau and Munger
1986; Kollman 1998). Newer research has disputed these connections individually, of-
fering new alternatives that show that legislators weigh the cost of providing information
less when processing information from political parties (Aldrich 2011), messages from
constituents (Bergan 2009), professional lobbyists (Powell 2012), and polling (Butler and
Nickerson 2011). Previous research shows legislators choose among multiple information
sources based on the needs and opportunities legislators have (Mooney 1991a,b) to process
information, the current information environment has flattened the costs of providing in-
formation, disrupting the cost heuristic. This raises questions about how legislators weigh
information sources when they cannot use cost as a heuristic about the value of information.
To answer these questions, I develop a theory of political information. I envision po-
litical information as a marketplace where trust replaces cost as a heuristic for evaluating
the value of information. Like other markets, legislators use other heuristics to evaluate
the value of information, but trustworthiness is the central feature of the market rather than
cost. Compared to a cost-centered market, the penalties for error in a trust-centered mar-
ket are much higher. Resources become more important; legislators need time, money,
and people to generate more reputation-building interactions with outside sources of in-
formation. More interactions help legislators determine which sources of information are
trustworthy and which are not. In addition, constraints make legislators more risk-averse,
causing them to interact less in the marketplace, and making them trust only the sources
closest to them.
To test this theory, I use a survey sent to every state legislator in the United States to
examine how state legislators rank sources of information on trustworthiness. I use a multi-
nomial logistic regression model to determine the effects of resources and party constraints
on which source of information legislators rank as the most trustworthy. I find statisti-
cally significant and substantial variation in the most trusted sources of information across
legislatures with regard to legislative professionalism, and among individual legislators de-
pending on whether they are in the majority party or not. Resources and constraints shape a
trust-centered market. When legislators in the minority have more resources, they are able
to interact more in the marketplace of information, showing more variance in the source
of information they trust most. Legislators in the majority party are more risk averse, trust
information from advisors most, and increase this reliance as these advisors are more likely
to be paid by the legislator or the legislator’s party. These findings also suggest that effects
showing legislators changing their behavior in response to polling information, grassroots
lobbying, and lobbyist information occur only in less-resourced legislatures and among
minority party members, who are most likely to seek sources outside their advisors. They
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also suggest larger implications about the role of information flows and trust in politics.
Trust Shapes Information Processing
Information is essential to decision making and helps organizations function (March
1994). Information also plays a central role in legislative politics (Webber 1987; Kre-
hbiel 1991; Mooney 1991b), helping legislators make choices based on their own goals in
the legislature. Legislators use information to choose actions to help them get re-elected
(Mayhew 1974), handle constituents in their districts (Fenno 1978), and gain power within
their committees (Fenno 1973) and their party (Rohde 1991). Like other humans, legis-
lators use heuristics, or information shortcuts, to evaluate information and choose which
pieces of information to use or ignore (Simon 1955). Heuristics help legislators navigate
information choices (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2015). Normally, these heuristics are
a response to deficit or overload of information (Ringe and Victor 2013). Legislators use
the cost expended by the provider of information as the central feature of an information
market. However, the expansion of the internet and human-generated data has flattened
the costs of providing information to legislators, meaning that the costs of providing high-
quality information to legislators has declined relative to the cost of providing low-quality
information to legislators. Now, rather than cost, legislators use trust as the central feature
of the marketplace of information to determine the usefulness of information. Legislators
have always wanted trustworthy information, and have previously used it as a heuristic to
navigate cost-based markets. Now, however, trust is the central feature of the market. Trust
is more difficult to build than cost or value, and requires regular information exchanges to
maintain. How legislators trust information is contingent then on the resources they have
to find trustworthy information and the risk they are willing to bear when trying to build
trusting relationships.
American legislatures reward members who gain information and use it effectively (Lu-
pia and McCubbins 1994). Obtaining, processing, and evaluating information is important
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to legislators. Legislators develop institutional structures and rules to assist information
processing (Jameson 1894; Higginson 1986). Studies of institutional systems show that
these informational arrangements also shape the power of legislators within the body. Kre-
hbiel (1991) argued that the committee structure of the U.S. Congress was designed to
create unbiased and representative committees by encouraging individual legislators to be-
come policy experts. While Krehbiel’s findings are disputed by scholars who argue for
a more party-centered organizational structure (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2004;
Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010), the finding that legislators need information and that
committee structures help them process information remains robust.
Heuristics and Information Overload
Searching for and gathering information is not an easy process for legislators. Leg-
islators face information overload, meaning that they have more information than they
can adequately process (Ringe and Victor 2013). Legislators develop shortcuts to help
them process information (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). However, legislators are not
naive searchers. Legislators know that the information they are provided with is not free
of bias (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). They depend on shortcuts to help better under-
stand the information that they are presented. The heuristics that legislators use develop
similarly to heuristics other humans use. Legislators prefer sources that seem similar to
them (Matthews and Stimson 1977; Butler, Karpowitz and Pope 2012). Legislators prefer
sources that are current or recent (Kingdon 1984), or are close to the legislator (Mooney
1991b; Braithwaite and Levi 1998). Under all these heuristics, there is a signaling process
that takes place.
Legislators use these heuristics to help navigate information marketplaces that have cost
as their central feature. Legislators think that expertise is a precious commodity (Krehbiel
1991; Weissert 1991), and are willing to expend limited resources in order to obtain it (Gus-
ton, Jones and Branscomb 1997). Research that incorporates decision making on legislator
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information argues that legislators value information on two dimensions: the usefulness
of information in accomplishing their goals (Kingdon 1981; Ringe and Victor 2013) and
the cost to the outside source of producing the information for the legislator (Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1989; Kollman 1998; Hall and Deardorff 2006). These two dimensions create a
cost-driven market for information. Information may be plentiful, but good information
is scarce. In a cost-driven market, legislators evaluate information based on the cost of
providing the information to the legislature, and use heuristics to assist this evaluation.
While legislators use heuristics to navigate this environment, how one heuristic dom-
inates others in evaluating information remains unclear. Heuristics also overlap with one
another. As an example, previous research shows that legislators prefer information that
they received recently over information they obtained less recently. They also prefer in-
formation from sources they interact with daily over sources they see or hear from only
every other month. They also prefer information from people who are similar to them than
people who are different from them. However, legislators tend to interact most recently
and regularly with people who are similar to them (Kingdon 1984), making it difficult
to unpack the recency, regularity, and similarity heuristics from one another. Legislators
want information that is valuable, but they also want information that comports with their
preferences.
The Flattening of Information Costs
However, in contemporary legislative politics, the costs of producing information have
flattened, meaning that the cost of producing one additional unit of information or one de-
gree of better quality information has decreased. Cost flattening has occurred because ad-
vances in technology make producing high-quality information far less expensive without
greatly increasing the cost of producing low quality information (Trelles et al. 2011). This
disrupts cost as the central feature of information markets (Hall and Miler 2008). In cost-
flattened environments, legislators receive multiple pieces of information that cost about
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the same to provide to the legislator, but vary in content. The heuristics that legislators use
remain similar, but cost is no longer useful in determining the value of information.
Other scholars find that in cost-flattened environments, people seeking information use
trust as the central feature of a marketplace of information. Information scientists describe
cost-flattened information environments as a marketplace of information with trust as its
central feature (Turoff and Chinai 1985; Fodness and Murray 1997; Lesser, Horling, Raja,
Wagner and Zhang 2000). Marketplace models of information allocate resources to end
users based on the desire for information, the value assigned to that information, and the
cost of that information. These models help actors deal with cost-flattened environments by
using trust to regulate them (Atkins et al. 1996). Trust replaces cost as the central feature
in the market: buyers use trust as a signal of information value, and sellers use trust as a
signal to buyers about the value of the information they are offering.1 I apply this model to
politics; political actors create and sell information in a marketplace environment to other
political actors who want to buy information in order to accomplish their goals. In the
marketplace of information, the central focus is trust, rather than cost. Legislators always
wanted trustworthy information, but in cost-flattened environments, it is the central focus
for other information process heuristics.
Building Trust
Building trust is not easy for legislators. Trust is highly dependent on the reputation of
the information source (Masum and Tovey 2012), and building a quality reputation requires
regular interactions with people who want the information provided. Trust also requires
agents to help determine which sources are trustworthy and which are not (Milgrom and
North 1990). Trust-building is thus resource-intensive in a way that evaluating cost is not.
In a cost-centered information market, legislators do not need regular interactions in the
1Two notable examples appear the information science literature. First, people use trust to choose which
online reviews (for goods and services) to believe (Chen, Shang and Kao 2009). They also previously used
trust to pick websites for illegally downloading copyrighted material, but this process is more complicated
with the development of new file sharing technologies (Mui, Mohtashemi and Halberstadt 2002).
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market or agents to make information choices; their choices are conditioned only on the
cost of the information (Bybee and Comadena 1984).
Trust-based models also require that people seeking information accept more risk than
cost-based models. When trust is the central feature of an information market, legislators
bear more risk when they trust unfamiliar sources of information because the negative
consequences of making an imperfect trust decision are higher than making an imperfect
cost decision (Kim, Ferrin and Rao 2008). As legislators become more risk-averse, they
should be less trustworthy of new or outside sources of information.
Trust and Distance
Trust-centered markets also alter the relationship between information sources and
the legislator’s distance to them. Mooney (1991b,a), examining legislatures under a cost
model, treats distance as a function of familiarity with the job of legislating on a day-to-
day basis. Other legislators and party leaders are considered inside sources, having a daily
schedule that looks very much like a legislator’s, and being most familiar with the legisla-
tor’s job. Advisors are the next closest, followed by professional lobbyists, an example of a
“middle range” source (Sabatier and Whiteman 1985). In cost models, constituents are the
furthest from legislators, and are considered to be the least reliable sources of information.
In trust-centered information environments, distance becomes a feeling of shared goals
rather than shared experiences. The more goals or interests the information recipient shares
with the source of information, the closer the information source is to the recipient (Ziegler
and Golbeck 2007). Legislators thus alter which sources they consider closest to them. In
trust markets, advisors, who legislators depend on for reliable information, are the closest
sources of information. Other legislators, lobbyists, and party leaders are “middle range”
sources. Middle range sources share goals with the legislator, but have other priorities
like cultivating a governing majority (Francis 1985; Bianco and Sened 2005) in the case
of party leaders, or winning policy battles by cultivating and lobbying allies (Hojnacki and
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Kimball 1998; Esterling 2007). Outside sources, like constituents, share, on average, the
fewest goals of the legislator, even though they may ally to re-elect the legislator and have
similar policy preferences.
How Party and Resources Shape Trust in State Legislatures
If trust is the central feature of the information market in legislatures, legislators will
find different sources of information trustworthy. This is because the resources legislators
have and their willingness to accept risk condition their ability to build trust with informa-
tion sources. When legislatures are more professionalized, legislators have more time to
have repeated interactions with information sources and trustworthy agents, reducing their
trust in other professional sources of information. Being in the majority party increases the
risk aversion of legislators because majorities have governing coalitions to protect. This
risk aversion reduces legislator trust in outside sources of information. In addition, the
relationship between legislative professionalism and majority party status are interactive;
resources give minority members more ability to trust outside sources of information, but
they reinforce the risk aversion of majority party legislators. Majority party legislators in
professionalized institutions have more to lose, and become more risk averse.
The resources their institution provides legislators should both promote and constrain
their trust relationships, based on the source of information. A legislator in a more pro-
fessionalized institution, one that provides more time, money, and staff for legislators to
do their other work, can better process information and develop trustworthy information
sources because more professionalized legislatures give legislators time to gain experience
in the information marketplace and to use agents (staff) to facilitate trust relationships.
Legislators in more professionalized chambers also receive additional pay, which should
reduce distractions of other work, and focus the legislator more on developing trustworthy
relationships with information sources. With more resources, legislators will be more trust-
worthy of sources closest to them because those sources are likely paid by the legislator,
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cementing the trust relationship. At the same time, legislators will become less trustworthy
of other “professional” sources of information, that is, information sources who are paid to
provide information to the legislator because staff act as a filter between those sources and
the legislator. However, outside sources like email messages from constituents are more
trusted because legislators have more ability to interact with them.
When parties operate as cartels in legislatures (Cox and McCubbins 2004), they con-
strain the behavior of legislators in order to preserve majority party status and retain control
over the policy agenda. As a result, legislators in the majority party process information
in different ways from legislators in the minority party (Francis and Riddlesperger 1982).
Majority party legislators have more to lose, and are more risk averse. By being in the ma-
jority, the trust relationships of legislators are constrained. This in turn focuses members
on sources that they have regular interaction with and who are known to share the interest
of preserving the party majority. In turn, minority party members, being less risk-averse,
may develop trust relationships with outside sources in order to attempt to gain a majority.
Because minority party members are less-risk averse, they are more willing, in general, to
trust outside sources of information.
There also should be an interactive effect between party status and resources. As legis-
lators gain more resources, they become more insulated from shifts in party control in the
legislature. Being in the majority reduces the effects of resources on trust because legisla-
tors become even more risk averse, while being in the minority exacerbates them, making
legislators more free to build trust relationships.
Majority party status and legislative professionalism, along with the interaction be-
tween them, affect how legislators choose among different information sources. In general,
they affect choices based on the closeness of the information source to them, and the pro-
fessional nature of that closeness. However, the way that legislative professionalism and
majority party status affect trust in each source individually vary based on the particular
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dynamics of that source.
I sort this section into five groups, ordered from closest to furthest from the legislator
in a trust-centered market. The five categories are: advisors, party leaders, professional
lobbyists, email messages from constituents, and polling information. The five categories
constitute a range of sources that appear in other studies of how legislators gain information
(Kingdon 1981; Mooney 1991b).
Advisors
Advisors hold different official roles: they may be staff, interns, former legislators,
political bosses, spouses, or merely concerned citizens. Regardless of job title, advisors are
usually the most dependable source of information for legislators, and are used to bridge
the gap between legislators and other information sources, like lobbyists, fellow legislators,
and constituents (Fenno 1978; Mooney 1991b).
The structure of party should not affect this trust greatly, members in both majority and
minority parties depend on a trusted group advisors for reliable and trustworthy informa-
tion. However, this trust in advisors is likely to increase for members of more professional-
ized legislatures. With more money to pay high-quality staff, legislators are likely to trust
their employees more than people who are unpaid and therefore have political interests be-
yond the legislator, or depend on another source of income that may also run counter to the
legislator’s best interests.
Party Leaders
Legislators in the majority party should trust their leaders more than legislators in the
minority. Trust is essential to maintaining party control of government. Rohde (1991)
argues that the strength of party leaders flows from the consent and inherent trust of party
members. Unconstrained by the responsibilities of governing, legislators in the minority
are less dependent on their leaders for information, and thus less likely to trust them.
As resources in legislatures increase, the stakes of holding a majority in the legisla-
ture increase. With control of the agenda, legislators in professionalized legislatures have
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more staff to craft legislation, more pay to reduce their need for outside employment, and
more time in which to move legislation through the policy process. At the same time, pro-
fessionalized legislatures make legislators less reliant on outside professional sources of
information.
Professional Lobbyists
Previous research has found that professionalized legislatures have a greater need for
information from lobbyists (Berkman 2001), but that professionalization promotes insti-
tutionalization, insulating legislators from lobbying (Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman
2000). However, this seems to be based in the idea that lobbying is about the provision
of expertise (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987), rather than a subsidy or provision of other
resources (Hall and Deardorff 2006). A recent survey of state legislators found that they
seek campaign contributions from professional lobbyists rather than information (Powell
2012), regardless of the legislator’s goals in the institution.
As a result, while majority party members are less likely to trust lobbyists than minority
party members, consistent with the constraints placed on the majority, there should be no
effect of legislative professionalism on the trust of professional lobbyists among majority
party members. While minority party members should trust professional lobbyists less
as they become more professionalized, majority party members should trust lobbyists at
similar levels in citizen and professionalized legislatures.
Email Messages From Constituents
Constituents email messages to legislators frequently about policy issues (Butler, Kar-
powitz and Pope 2012), a practice also called grasroots lobbying. Previous work using
cost-based models considers grassroots lobbying a costly signal between interest groups,
constituents, and legislators (Kollman 1998). However, the number of emails sent to leg-
islators by constituents has increased tenfold over the last five years (Karpf 2012), over-
loading legislators with information and reducing the ability of legislators to use cost to
evaluate the value of information.
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Legislators in the majority party want to protect their majority, but are constrained
by the behavior of other members in the majority attempting to maintain agenda control
(Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010). They also do not know if the emails being sent are
representative of their constituents, or represent a subset of individuals who feel strongly
on the issue (Frantzich 1986), meaning that information from grassroots lobbying does
not reliably threaten the majority party status of a legislator. As a result, legislators in the
majority are less likely to find email messages from constituents trustworthy.
Legislative professionalism magnifies these effects. Having more resources gives mi-
nority party legislators a more effective means of interacting with constituent contacts reg-
ularly, making them more likely to trust email messages from constituents, free of the
pressures of maintaining agenda control. In turn, majority party members are less likely to
trust email messages from constituents because they have more to protect in the majority.
Polling Information
It is difficult to generate expectations about the value of polling information from a
legislator’s district. Having been elected, legislators believe that they understand the pref-
erences of their constituents and can represent them well (Fenno 1977). Legislators in more
professionalized institutions have been found to monitor the opinions of citizens more than
legislators in less professionalized institutions (Maestas 2003). However, in experimental
conditions, legislators in less professionalized states are highly responsive to polling in-
formation on single bills provided to them by researchers (Butler and Broockman 2011).2
Trust in polling information is difficult to predict given the competing pressures on it.
Hypotheses
From these expectations, I generate four hypotheses.
2These effects are magnified further when information sharing among legislators is modeled into the
findings (Coppock 2014).
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Hypothesis 7 As legislative professionalism increases, legislators are more likely
to name email from constituents as their most trustworthy source of
information, but this effect is only true for minority legislators.
Hypothesis 8 Legislators in the majority party will be more likely to trust advisors
over other sources than legislators in the minority party, regardless
of the professionalization of the legislature.
Hypothesis 9 There should be no effect of legislative professionalism on how leg-
islators rank the trustworthiness of professional lobbyists.
Hypothesis 10 Members of the majority party are more likely to list party leaders
as most trustworthy across levels of legislative professionalism.
Data and Methods
The dependent variable for the analysis was generated from a survey sent to every state
legislator with an email address in all 50 states. The survey contained a question asking
respondents to rank five sources of information on trustworthiness.3 The sources in the list
were: trusted advisors, professional lobbyists, party leaders, polling information from your
district and email messages from constituents. I randomized the order of the responses to
prevent satisficing and bias towards a single choice.4 499 of 512 total respondents answered
the trustworthiness question. From this question, I generated an unordered categorical
variable of the information source that the legislator ranked as “1,” or most trustworthy.
The first explanatory variable I use in the model is a multi-dimensional scaling measure
of legislative professionalism developed by Bowen and Greene (2014). Other measures of
legislative professionalism index legislator pay, staff expenditures, and days in session to
the United States Congress(Squire 1993; Mooney 1995; Squire 2007), but these measures
3The exact question reads: Who do you find most trustworthy for information to help you accomplish
your goals in the legislature (please rank, with 1 being most trustworthy and 5 being least trustworthy)?
4The order of source appearance has no effect in the models, nor does it predict how the respondent sorted
the information sources.
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compress the variance across state legislatures. The Bowen and Greene scale uses similar
components to the Squire measure, and in some models, performs similarly. I use the most
recently available first dimension of the multi-dimensional scaling component, those from
2010 and 2011. I used 2011 only when states did not hold a 2010 session. These data are
more recent by seven years than the last published version of the Squire Index.
For majority party status, I create a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the legislator is
a member of the majority party in their legislative chamber, and 0 otherwise. I match the
legislator’s party to party majorities within the legislative chamber using data from the
2014 edition of the Book of the States. If the legislature was not in session in 2014, I use
the closest session previous to 2014. None of the legislators in the sample changed parties
during the relevant sessions. I exclude Nebraska, which has no formal legislative parties,
from the analysis.5
I also incorporate an interaction term in the model. The effect of legislative profes-
sionalism should be different based on the majority party status of the legislator. A longer
session, more legislator pay, and more staff expenditures all raise the stakes for holding a
majority and encourage innovation among the minority. As a result, the effect of majority
status should change across the distribution of legislative professionalism; legislators with
more resources provided to them will have more lose and be more risk averse if they are
the majority, but will be enabled to innovate more if they are in the minority.
Methodologically, I use a multinomial logit model to calculate the effects of the Bowen
and Greene legislative professionalism measure, majority party status, and the interaction
between majority party status and legislative professionalism on the respondent’s most
trustworthy information source. A multinomial logit model is, given the data-generating
process and the topic, less likely to produce estimation problems than other models that use
5Nebraska majority governing coalitions include members of both the Democratic and Republican parties.
In addition, these governing majorities operate differently from party-based governing coalitions in other
states (Wright and Schaffner 2002).
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this type of dependent variable.6 In addition, because none of the covariates in the model
are choice-specific, using a multinomial probit model would be more likely to produce in-
accurate results (Quinn, Martin and Whitford 1999). Multinomial logit models work well
for unordered choices within surveys because the survey question constrains respondents
within a set of categories (Agresti 2013).
Results
Variable Levels n %
∑
%
Most Trusted Category Advisors 217 64.6 64.6
Email 22 6.5 71.1
Lobbyists 42 12.5 83.6
PartyLeaders 25 7.4 91.1
Polling 30 8.9 100.0
all 336 100.0
Party majority 321 65.6 65.6
minority 168 34.4 100.0
all 489 100.0
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Nominal Variables
Measure Value
n 336
Min -1.671
q1 -1.106
x˜ -0.616
x¯ -0.2359
q3 0.0923
Max 7.649
s 1.284
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Legislative Professionalism
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show descriptive statistics of the variables in the model. Table 4.3
shows the results of the multinomial logit model.7 The excluded category is advisors.
6Multinomial logit models rely on the assumption of the independence of irrevelant alternatives (IIA), but
simulations of both multinomial logit and multinomial probit models show that even when the IIA assumption
is violated, multinomial logit models are preferred (Kropko 2008).
7Weighting the responses of the survey on gender, race, and party at the chamber and state did not sub-
stantially alter the results.
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Table 4.3: Unordered Multinomial Logit Results:
Most Trustworthy Information Source
Most Trustworthy Source of Information♣
Email Lobbyists Party Leaders Polling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legislative Professionalism 0.064 −0.832∗∗ 0.116 −1.027∗∗
(0.264) (0.421) (0.244) (0.482)
In Majority Party −0.447 0.303 −0.854 −0.174
(0.476) (0.454) (0.575) (0.551)
Leg. Prof X Majority −0.213 0.756∗ −0.914∗ 0.864
(0.371) (0.451) (0.494) (0.542)
Constant −2.003∗∗∗ −1.921∗∗∗ −1.911∗∗∗ −2.139∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.402) (0.347) (0.465)
AIC 748.326
N 499
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
♣ Excluded Category: Advisors
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of Most Trusted Information Source
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Multinomial model coefficients from the regression table do not provide an easily inter-
pretable test of the hypotheses, especially with the interaction term included in the model.
Also, predicted probability plots are greatly preferred in this case, where the hypotheses
estimate changes within each category over the range of the explanatory variables (Carsey
and Berry 2014). I estimate the predicted probability of being in each category across the
range of possible values of legislative professionalism by simulating values using the Zelig
software package (Imai, King and Lau 2008). These predicted probabilities allow an easier
interpretation of the results of the multinomial logit model.
Figure 4.1 shows the predicted probability for each information source being rated as
the most trustworthy information source, rated across the range of observed values of leg-
islative professionalism, and separated by minority and majority party status in the cham-
ber. The Y-axis shows the predicted probability of being in each particular category. The X
axis shows the range of values for the legislative professionalism measure. The solid lines
show predicted probabilities for majority party status equal to 1, while the dashed lines
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show predicted probability where majority party status is equal to 0. Note that the Y-axis
is scaled for each information source for ease of interpretation.
The predicted probability that a legislator chose advisors as their most trustworthy
source of information is highest among the five information source categories at every value
of legislative professionalism and for both minority and majority party legislators. The pre-
dicted probability that a minority party legislator in the sample chose advisors ranges from
approximately .40 at the minimum level of legislative professionalism to .63 at the maxi-
mum level of legislative professionalism. The predicted probability that a majority party
legislator in the sample chose advisors is higher across the distribution of legislative pro-
fessionalism, approximately .69 at the minimum level of legislative professionalism, and
approximately .86 at the maximum level of legislative professionalism. The separation be-
tween majority and minority party leaders is highest at the extreme values of legislative
professionalism. These findings show limited support for Hypothesis 8 – that legislators in
the majority party will be more likely to trust advisors over other sources than legislators
in the minority party, regardless of the professionalization of the legislature. The predicted
probabilities show that while legislators in the majority party are more likely than minor-
ity paty legislators to chose advisors as their most trustworthy information source across
the distribution of legislative professionalism, the difference is highest at the extremes of
legislative professionalism.
The predicted probability that legislators in the sample chose party leaders as the most
trusted source of information shows evidence counter to Hypothesis 10, that members of
the majority party are more likely to list party leaders as most trustworthy across levels
of legislative professionalism. The predicted probability that a minority party legislator
in the sample chose party leaders ranges from approximately .05 at the minimum level
of legislative professionalism to approximately .23 at the maximum level of legislative
professionalism. The predicted probability that a majority party legislator in the sample
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chose party leaders ranges from approximately .14 at the minimum level of legislative
professionalism to less than .01 at the maximum level of legislative professionalism. There
is more variation in predicted probability among minority party legislators especially; the
predicted probability that legislators will choose party leaders more than quadruples over
the distribution of legislative professionalism. Majority party members are less likely than
minority party members to choose party leaders as their most trusted source of information
for most states. This evidence counters Hypothesis 10, which predicted the opposite to
occur.
The predicted probability that legislators in the sample chose professional lobbyists as
their most trustworthy information source can be used to evaluate Hypothesis 9– that there
should be no effect of legislative professionalism on how legislators rank the trustworthi-
ness of professional lobbyists. The predicted probability that a minority party legislator
in the sample chose professional lobbyists ranges from approximately .24 at the minimum
level of legislative professionalism to less than .01 at the maximum level of legislative pro-
fessionalism. The predicted probability that a majority party legislator in the sample chose
professional lobbyists ranges from approximately .13 at the minimum level of legislative
professionalism to less than .09 at the maximum level of legislative professionalism. There
is more variation in predicted probability among minority party legislators especially; the
predicted probability that they chose lobbyists as their most trustworthy goes to near zero
for legislatures at the middle range of legislative professionalism (also called “hybrid” leg-
islatures) and professional legislatures. This evidence runs counter to Hypothesis 9; legisla-
tive professionalism has a negative effect on the predicted probability of choosing lobbyists
as the most trustworthy information source, especially for minority party legislators.
The portion of predicted probability plot labeled “Email” shows the results from test-
ing Hypothesis 7, that as legislative professionalism increases, legislators are more likely
to name email from constituents as their most trustworthy source of information, but that
72
this effect is only true for minority legislators. The predicted probability that a legislator
chose email as the most trustworthy source increases over the distribution of legislative
professionalism for minority party legislators, but decreases for legislators in the majority
party. The predicted probability that a legislator in the sample chose email ranges from
approximately .048 to .139 across the range of legislative professionalism values for legis-
lators in the minority. The same predicted probability for legislators in the majority ranges
from approximately .065 at the minimum value of legislative professionalism to .023 at
the maximum value of legislative professionalism. In the most professionalized legisla-
tures, minority party legislators in the sample are six times more likely to say they think
email messages from constituents are their most trustworthy source of information than are
majority party legislators. This shows some support for Hypothesis 7; legislators in the mi-
nority party are more likely to trust emails from constituents at higher levels of legislative
professionalism.
While I do not make any hypotheses relevant to shifts in the trustworthiness of polling
information from their district, there is noticeable variation in the data. The predicted prob-
ability that a minority party legislator in the sample chose polling information ranges from
approximately .26 at the minimum level of legislative professionalism to less than .01 at
the maximum level of legislative professionalism. The predicted probability that a majority
party legislator in the sample chose polling information ranges from approximately .08 at
the minimum level of legislative professionalism to less than .02 at the maximum level of
legislative professionalism.
Discussion and Implications
The results of the analysis show that legislative party status and professionalism affect
how legislators rank the trustworthiness of information sources. Trust appears to me less of
a random heuristic among legislators and more of a central feature in a marketplace of polit-
ical information. I find support for the hypotheses related to advisors and email messages
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from constituents. While I did not find support for Hypotheses 10 and 9, the predicted
probabilities generated from the analysis of party leaders and lobbyists show significant
differences across the distribution of legislative professionalism, the results also indicate
that my understanding of trustworthiness needs additional refinements. The variation sug-
gests that legislators who have more resources become even more trusting of advisors, and
that minority party members become more trusting of party leaders and email from con-
stituents as professionalism increases. It is possible that cost flattening may be inconsistent
across different sources of information as well, and that information overload disrupts these
processes at different rates. These results also have implications for disparate research in
political science.
Previous research has shown that email messages from constituents were successful in
affecting legislator decision making in a field experiment conducted in New Hampshire
(Bergan 2009), the state ranked lowest on all measures of legislative professionalism, and
further, that these messages were a costly signal to legislators. My work counters both
of these findings; trust matters to legislators when evaluating email messages from con-
stituents, and minority and majority legislators separate in their ratings of trustworthiness
in more professionalized bodies.
Also relevant to previous research is the higher predicted probability of choosing lobby-
ists as the most trustworthy source of information at low levels of professionalism. Citizen
legislators are more likely to rank information from professional lobbyists as most trust-
worthy than more professionalized legislators. Legislative staff may replace professional
lobbyists as a paid source of information for these legislators. With any staff, they do not
need information from lobbyists.
Lobbyists may also be responding to other factors in the legislature. Minority party
members are far less trusting of professional lobbyists than majority party members except
at the lowest levels of legislative professionalism. It may be that majority party members
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do not need information from lobbyists and seek campaign contributions instead. This is
consistent with research showing that lobbyists cultivate allies in legislative committees,
and subsidize those allies (Hall and Deardorff 2006).
While my theory does not generate expectations relative to polling information, it is
particularly interesting given the findings of Butler and Nickerson’s (2011) field experiment
in New Mexico and subsequent replication and extensions of their data analysis (Coppock
2014). New Mexico has a citizen legislature, where legislators are much more likely to rate
polling information from their district as the most trustworthy source of information than
legislators in more professionalized bodies, suggesting that these results may not reproduce
in other states.
Beyond these specific findings, these results have implications about how political ac-
tors weigh sources of information relative to one another. Much of the research around
trust focuses on citizens, rather than institutions. Trust is usually measured as overall trust
in government or a characteristic rating of a single person or institution. Asking citizens
to rank people and institutions on trustworthiness may reveal more subtle connections be-
tween trust and democratic governance.
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A SURVEY REGRESSION RESULTS
Regression Results
Table A.1: Logistic Regression of Treatment Variables
Introduce Cosponsor Vote for Bill Urge Support
GMOs/High Vol. −0.811∗ −0.553∗ −0.327 −0.448
(0.457) (0.324) (0.284) (0.346)
Guns/Low Vol. −1.152∗∗ −1.365∗∗∗ −1.174∗∗∗ −1.071∗∗
(0.534) (0.411) (0.334) (0.419)
Guns/High Vol. −1.197∗∗ −0.753∗∗ −0.383 −0.703∗
(0.534) (0.348) (0.294) (0.376)
Constant −1.705∗∗∗ −0.856∗∗∗ −0.310 −1.151∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.214) (0.198) (0.229)
N 399 399 399 399
AIC 232.311 386.126 497.959 354.742
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
B SURVEY TEXT
Survey
The following pages contain a full text copy of the survey downloaded from Qualtrics.
 Q3 Some legislators answer their own e-mail, but many others have staff who answer e-mail for 
them. Are you a legislator yourself, or are you a staff member? 
 Legislator (1) 
 Staff Member (2) 
 
Q2 In the current or most recent legislative session, approximately how many emails have you 
received from constituents asking you to support or oppose a piece of legislation? 
 
Q6 In the last legislative session, approximately how many contacts have you had with 
registered lobbyists asking you to support or oppose a piece of legislation? 
 
Q47 I want to ask you a few questions about information you receive from leaders in your party, 
professional lobbyists, constituents, polling information from your district, and trusted advisors. 
 
Q43 Would you say that you get enough information to accomplish your goals as a legislator or 
as a staff member from... 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
State Party Leaders (1)     
Professional Lobbyists (2)     
Emails from constituents (3)     
Trusted advisors (4)     
Polling information from your 
district (5) 
    
Q44 Would you say that you are barraged with too much information from... 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
State party leaders (1)     
Professional lobbyists (2)     
Emails from constituents (3)     
Polling information from your 
district (4) 
    
Trusted advisors (5)     
 
Answer If Would you say that you are barraged with too much information from...  - Yes Is 
Selected 
Q45 Do you think that you lack the time or resources to efficiently process the information you 
receive? 
 Yes, lack time (1) 
 Yes, lack resources (2) 
 Yes, lack time and resources (3) 
 No (4) 
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Q8 The next set of questions deals with different interest groups in your district.  
 
Q7 I want to ask you about interest groups in your district. On a scale of 0 to 100, please 
estimate the percent of your constituents who agree with the policy agenda of the following 
groups. 
______ AFL-CIO (1) 
______ Family Research Council (2) 
______ National Rifle Association (3) 
______ Sierra Club (4) 
______ Planned Parenthood (5) 
______ Chamber of Commerce (6) 
 
Q9 Similarly, please rate how much email you get from constituents that you think is generated 
by these groups. 
 None (1) Little (2) Some (3) A Lot (4) 
AFL-CIO (1)         
Family Research 
Council (2) 
        
National Rifle 
Association (3) 
        
Sierra Club (4)         
Planned 
Parenthood (5) 
        
Chamber of 
Commerce (6) 
        
 
 
Q12 Who do you find most trustworthy for information to help you accomplish your goals in the 
legislature (please rank, with 1 being most trustworthy and 5 being least trustworthy)? 
______ State party leaders (1) 
______ Trusted advisors (2) 
______ Professional lobbyists (3) 
______ Polling information from your district (4) 
______ Email messages from constituents. (5) 
 
Q11 Which statement best describes your plans for the next election cycle? 
 Very likely to seek re-election in my current office (1) 
 Equal chance of seeking re-election or not seeking re-election in my current office (2) 
 Term-limited out of my current office (3) 
 Plan to run for a different office (4) 
 Undecided (5) 
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Q5 What best describes your current role in the office? 
 Chief of Staff (1) 
 Communications (2) 
 Constituent Service (3) 
 Policy (4) 
 
Q48 In the average week in session, how many hours do you spend responding to constituent 
emails? 
 
LAX For the next question imagine you have received the following email from  a constituent 
and 6 others similar to it about a fictional bill.   I am writing to you to urge you to support Senate 
Bill 516,  legislation requiring genetically modified (GMO) foods be labeled. Unsuspecting 
consumers by the tens of millions are being allowed to purchase and consume unlabeled 
genetically engineered foods, despite a finding by FDA scientists that these foods could pose 
serious risks and despite the fact that FDA does not do any testing of its own. Labeling GMO 
foods helps give people the freedom to choose what they want to buy, and protects consumers 
who are worried about the safety of GMO foods.GMO foods require labeling in nearly 50 
countries around the world including the united Kingdom, Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand 
and many others. Would you help make this a reality by supporting the bill to require labeling of 
genetically modified foods?   
 
LPX For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
6 others similar to it about a fictional bill.  I am writing to you to urge you to support Senate Bill 
516, legislation requiring genetically modified (GMO) foods be labeled. I&#39;m worried about 
the safety of GMO foods, and want to know what I&#39;m buying at the grocery store.  Labeling 
GMO foods helps give people the freedom to choose what they want to buy, and protects 
consumers who are worried about the safety of GMO foods.  I&#39;ve heard that they label 
genetically modified foods in many other places, and I think it would be a good idea to start 
labeling them here. That way, we know what we&#39;re getting.  Would you help make this a 
reality by supporting this bill?    
 
Q37 For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
6 others similar to it about a fictional bill.   I am writing to you to support Senate Bill 516, 
legislation restricting handgun purchases to one handgun per 45-day period. Laws limiting an 
individual’s ability to purchase multiple firearms within a short span of time reduce gun 
trafficking, specifically the number of guns entering the illegal market and flowing between 
states.     I support the Second Amendment and own several guns myself, but I don&#39;t want 
guns in the hands of gun-runners and criminals.     Firearms sold in “multiple sales” are 
frequently used in crime. About 22% of crime guns are guns from multiple sales. Furthermore, 
guns from multiple sales 64% more likely to be used in crime than guns from single 
sales.  Legislation like this in other states reduces the number of crime guns linked to that 
state.     Will you help make this legislation a reality by co-sponsoring this bill? 
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Q38 For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
6 others similar to it about a fictional bill.   I am writing to you to support Senate Bill 516, 
legislation restricting handgun purchases to one handgun per 45-day period. I don't want 
criminals coming to our state to buy guns, or people in other states accusing gun shop owners 
here of aiding criminals.  I support the Second Amendment and own several guns myself, but I 
don't want guns in the hands of gun-runners and criminals. Most people I know who carry for 
self-defense buy one handgun at a time. It seems to me that if you're going to buy more than 
one handgun at once, you're likely to use them in crime. I've also heard that other states have 
laws that limit handgun purchases, and they've kept gun-running criminals out of their state. Will 
you help make this legislation a reality by supporting this bill?     
 
LAY For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
60 others similar to it about a fictional bill.   I am writing to you to urge you to support Senate Bill 
516,   legislation requiring GMO foods be labeled. Unsuspecting consumers by  the tens of 
millions are being allowed to purchase and consume unlabeled  genetically engineered foods, 
despite a finding by FDA scientists that  these foods could pose serious risks and despite the 
fact that FDA does  not do any testing of its own. Labeling GMO foods helps give  people the 
freedom to choose what they want to buy, and protects  consumers who are worried about the 
safety of GMO foods.GMO  foods require labeling in nearly 50 countries around the world 
including  the united Kingdom, Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand and many  others. Would 
you help make this a reality by co-sponsoring the bill to require labeling of genetically modified 
foods? 
 
LPY For the next question imagine you have received the following email from  a constituent 
and 60 others similar to it about a fictional bill.I  am writing to you to urge you to support Senate 
Bill 516, legislation  requiring GMO foods be labeled. I'm worried about the safety of GMO  
foods, and want to know what I'm buying at the grocery store. Labeling GMO foods helps give 
people the freedom to choose what they  want to buy, and protects consumers who are worried 
about the safety of  GMO foods.I've heard that they label genetically modified foods  in many 
other places, and I think it would be a good idea to start  labeling them here. That way, we know 
what we're getting.Would you help make this a reality by co-sponsoring the bill to require 
labeling of genetically modified foods? 
 
Q42 For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
60 others like it about a fictional bill. I am writing to you to support Senate Bill 516, legislation 
restricting handgun purchases to one handgun per 45-day period. Laws limiting an individual’s 
ability to purchase multiple firearms within a short span of time reduce gun trafficking, 
specifically the number of guns entering the illegal market and flowing between states. I support 
the Second Amendment and own several guns myself, but I don't want guns in the hands of 
gun-runners and criminals. Firearms sold in “multiple sales” are frequently used in crime. About 
22% of crime guns are guns from multiple sales, and 64% more likely to be used in crime than 
guns from single sales.  Legislation like this in other states reduces the number of crime guns 
linked to that state. Will you help make this legislation a reality by co-sponsoring this bill? 
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Q41 For the next question imagine you have received the following email from a constituent and 
60 others like it about a fictional bill. I am writing to you to support Senate Bill 516, legislation 
restricting handgun purchases to one handgun per 45-day period. I don't want criminals coming 
to our state to buy guns, or people in other states accusing gun shop owners here of aiding 
criminals.  I support the Second Amendment and own several guns myself, but I don't want 
guns in the hands of gun-runners and criminals. Most people I know who carry for self-defense 
buy one handgun at a time. It seems to me that no one with good intentions would need to buy 
more than one gun at a time. I've also heard that other states have laws that limit handgun 
purchases, and they've kept gun-running criminals out of their state. Will you help make this 
legislation a reality by co-sponsoring this bill? 
 
Q34 Which of the following actions would you be likely to take in response to this email? (Select 
All that apply) 
 Introduce a bill "by request" on behalf of the constituent (1) 
 Vote for the bill in my committee if appropriate (2) 
 Vote for the bill when it reaches the floor (3) 
 Break with state party leaders to support the bill (4) 
 Co-sponsor the bill at the constituent's request (5) 
 Urge fellow legislators to support the bill (6) 
 Vote against the bill (7) 
 Reply to the email personally (8) 
 Send a form response email to the constituent (9) 
 None of the above (10) 
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Q46 Do you think any of the following consequences would occur if you supported the bill? 
 Definitely 
yes (1) 
Probably 
yes (2) 
Probably 
not (3) 
Definitely 
not (4) 
Don't Know 
(5) 
Don't Care 
(6) 
My 
relection 
chances 
would be 
hurt if I 
supported 
this bill (1) 
            
I would 
lose the 
support of 
an 
important 
interest 
group if I 
supported 
this bill (2) 
            
I would get 
a lot more 
negative 
email than 
positive if I 
supported 
this bill (3) 
            
Leaders in 
my caucus 
would be 
upset with 
me if I 
supported 
this bill (4) 
            
I would 
lose the 
support of 
people 
outside my 
district if I 
supported 
this bill (5) 
            
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Q51 Do you think any of the following consequences would occur if you opposed the bill? 
 Definitely 
yes (1) 
Probably 
yes (2) 
Probably 
not (3) 
Definitely 
not (4) 
Don't Know 
(5) 
Don't Care 
(6) 
My 
relection 
chances 
would be 
hurt if I 
opposed 
this bill (1) 
            
I would 
lose the 
support of 
an 
important 
interest 
group if I 
opposed 
this bill (2) 
            
I would get 
a lot more 
negative 
email than 
positive if I 
opposed 
this bill (3) 
            
Leaders in 
my caucus 
would be 
upset with 
me if I 
opposed 
this bill (4) 
            
I would 
lose the 
support of 
people 
outside my 
district if I 
opposed 
this bill (5) 
            
 
 
Q15 A number of states have passed, or are considering, legislation which frees some public 
schools from certain state regulations and permits them to function independently. Some people 
say that these charter schools would be a good thing, because with fewer regulations, they 
would be able to try out new ideas for improving education. Others say charter schools would be 
a bad thing because regulations are necessary to guard against inferior or poor educational 
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practices. Which position do you agree more with -- that charter schools are a good thing for 
education, or that they are a bad thing for education? 
 Charter schools are a good thing for education (1) 
 They are a bad thing for education (2) 
 
Q17 A number of states have passed, or are considering, legislation which frees some public 
schools from certain state regulations and permits them to function independently. Some 
people, including powerful interest groups in your district, say that these charter schools would 
be a good thing, because with fewer regulations, they would be able to try out new ideas for 
improving education. Others say charter schools would be a bad thing because regulations are 
necessary to guard against inferior or poor educational practices. Which position do you agree 
more with -- that charter schools are a good thing for education, or that they are a bad thing for 
education? 
 Charter schools are a good thing for education (1) 
 They are a bad thing for education (2) 
 
Q19 A number of states have passed, or are considering, legislation which frees some public 
schools from certain state regulations and permits them to function independently. Some 
people, including a majority of poll respondents in your district, say that these charter schools 
would be a good thing, because with fewer regulations, they would be able to try out new ideas 
for improving education. Others say charter schools would be a bad thing because regulations 
are necessary to guard against inferior or poor educational practices. Which position do you 
agree more with -- that charter schools are a good thing for education, or that they are a bad 
thing for education? 
 Charter Schools are a good thing for education (1) 
 They are a bad thing for education (2) 
 
Q21 A number of states have passed, or are considering, legislation which frees some public 
schools from certain state regulations and permits them to function independently. Some 
people, including a large number of constituents who have called or emailed you, say that these 
charter schools would be a good thing, because with fewer regulations, they would be able to try 
out new ideas for improving education. Others say charter schools would be a bad thing 
because regulations are necessary to guard against inferior or poor educational practices. 
Which position do you agree more with -- that charter schools are a good thing for education, or 
that they are a bad thing for education? 
 Charter Schools are a good thing for education (1) 
 They are a bad thing for education (2) 
 
Q23 A number of states have passed, or are considering, legislation which frees some public 
schools from certain state regulations and permits them to function independently. Some 
people, including leaders in your party, say that these charter schools would be a good thing, 
because with fewer regulations, they would be able to try out new ideas for improving education. 
Others say charter schools would be a bad thing because regulations are necessary to guard 
85
against inferior or poor educational practices. Which position do you agree more with -- that 
charter schools are a good thing for education, or that they are a bad thing for education? 
 Charter Schools are a good thing for education (1) 
 They are a bad thing for education (2) 
 
Q29 The federal government is in the process of evaluating applications for building new 
nuclear power plants in the United States. Some say those applications shouldn't be approved 
because of safety concerns about nuclear power. Other people say nuclear power plants can 
provide needed electric power safely. Do you support or oppose building new nuclear power 
plants in your state? 
 Support building new power plants (1) 
 Oppose building new power plants (2) 
 
Q30 The federal government is in the process of evaluating applications for building new 
nuclear power plants in the United States. Some people, including powerful interest groups in 
your district, say those applications shouldn't be approved because of safety concerns about 
nuclear power. Other people say nuclear power plants can provide needed electric power 
safely. Do you support or oppose building new nuclear power plants in your state? 
 Support building new power plants (1) 
 Oppose building new power plants (2) 
 
Q31 The federal government is in the process of evaluating applications for building new 
nuclear power plants in the United States. Some people, including a majority of poll respondents 
in your district, say those applications shouldn't be approved because of safety concerns about 
nuclear power. Other people say nuclear power plants can provide needed electric power 
safely. Do you support or oppose building new nuclear power plants in your state? 
 Support building new power plants (1) 
 Oppose building new power plants (2) 
 
Q32 The federal government is in the process of evaluating applications for building new 
nuclear power plants in the United States. Some people, including a large number of 
constituents who have contacted your office, say those applications shouldn't be approved 
because of safety concerns about nuclear power.  Other people say nuclear power plants can 
provide needed electric power safely. Do you support or oppose building new nuclear power 
plants in your state? 
 Support building new power plants (1) 
 Oppose building new power plants (2) 
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Q33 The federal government is in the process of evaluating applications for building new 
nuclear power plants in the United States. Some people, including leaders in your party, say 
those applications shouldn't be approved because of safety concerns about nuclear power. 
Others people say nuclear power plants can provide needed electric power safely. Do you 
support or oppose building new nuclear power plants in your state? 
 Support building new power plants (1) 
 Oppose building new power plants (2) 
 
Q51 We know that surveys don't always tell the whole story. Please use this space to tell us 
about your experience receiving emails from constituents about policy issues.  
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